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INTRODUCTION  
 
Since the late 1980s, an increasing number of companies started to consider the delisting 
process as a strategic decision. The term “delisting” refers to the phenomenon of the removal 
of a listed company from the exchange in which it trades. Despite the importance of this 
phenomenon in the life of an organization and the increasing number of companies that in the 
21st century decide to go private, the delisting process is still little studied, in particular in less 
mature Stock Exchanges such as the Italian one. Different motivations can explain this gap: 
on one hand, this can be due to “the internal characteristics of the capitalist system” (Onesti et 
al., 2013, pp.2) and to the low number of both traded and delisted companies. On the other 
hand, there is still resistance to see the delisting as a possible winning strategy: the announce 
of an IPO is seen by a company as reason of proud, and the delisting is still considered as a 
traumatic and negative event by management.  
 
Given the complexity and heterogeneity of the public-to-private transactions (PtP), it is 
usually useful to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary delisting. The focus of our 
research will be the former case, even if we will introduce some concepts about involuntary 
delisting when considered worthwhile for comparison purposes. The voluntary delisting 
occurs when the parties that have the control of the company decides to revoke its listed 
status; on the other hand, as the name suggests, involuntary delisting is triggered by the 
Exchange’s regulators because the firm does not have any more the minimum requisites for 
being listed. In theory, the distinction between the two groups seems clear and 
straightforward; however there are some kinds of transactions, such as M&A, LBOs and 
tender offers, which fall midway between the two, and scholar do not agree about their 
classification. According to Geranio (2004) and Tutino et al., (2013) these transactions have 
to be considered involuntary delisting because their primary rationale is not to go public, thus 
the delisting is just a consequence, and they must go private for a decision of the Stock 
Exchange. However, according to the view of the majority (for instance, Chaplinsky et 
Ramchard 2007; You, 2008) LBOs, M&A, and tender offers have to be classified as 
voluntary because often the companies are willing to go private or, in any case, are aware of 
the inevitable delisting due to the lack of necessary floating. In our paper we decide to follow 
this latter interpretation, keeping however in mind the contribution of Chaplinsky and 
Ramchard (2007) according to whom it is important to look at each individual situation in 
order to classify a transaction.   
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The choice of concentrating on voluntary delisting is driven by the fact that previous 
researches document that this is the most common type of PtP transactions in the 
Continental Europe. Moreover, this case is the most interesting from an administration point 
of view because it involves a management decision.  
The aim of this dissertation is to cover two main aspects that until now have been poorly 
debated:  
 To understand and to describe the main features of the voluntary delisting in Italy.  
 To help managers to comprehend whether and when the delisting creates value for the 
company.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. The first part (Chapters I to III) is about the literature 
review of the most relevant papers. The survey of the literature analyses the phenomenon 
from an international point of view, highlighting in particular the differences between the 
Anglo-Saxon markets and the Continental European ones. Chapter I provides an overview of 
the delisting process over time. The difficulties in finding researches about the topic are 
partially due to the fact that it is a quite recent phenomenon: the first delisting has been 
recorded only in the early 1980s in the U.S., and it has been necessary to wait until the late 
1990s to observe its emergence in Europe. These events usually occur in waves and the latest 
researches document that the recent financial crisis has determined an increase in the number 
of delistings relative to the number of IPOs. This part of the dissertation will illustrate the 
reasons of these waves; in other words, we collect the macroeconomics elements that could 
have an impact on the phenomenon.  
Chapter II looks at the pre-transaction and post-transaction context. In other words, first of 
all it is important to understand the reasons why some management has started to consider the 
surrender of the public status as a valuable strategy. The delisting occurs when the costs of 
listing exceed its benefits. The different explanations proposed by the literature have been 
reorganized in four groups: i)traditional incentives related; ii)agency theory; iii)financial 
structure; iv)defensive strategy against hostile takeovers. In addition, we will present the 
empirical studies that support or discredit each hypothesis. As it is, the European phenomenon 
emerges to be completely different from the Anglo-Saxon one; and this restates the 
importance of studying the Italian case, given the predominance of papers about the U.S. and 
the U.K. markets.  The second part of this chapter focuses on the consequences of delisting: 
unfortunately, a topic less studied than the previous one. Contrary to involuntary delisting, 
voluntary delisting is overall associated with wealth gain for shareholders. The benefits come 
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mainly from three sources: i)tax benefits; ii)asymmetric information and agency costs 
reduction; and iii)improvement in operating performance. This last point, however, is still 
well debatable and scholars do not agree about the impact of delisting on the financial 
indexes.  
Finally, in Chapter III we describe the most important techniques adopted to delist. In order 
to analyse this topic, it results more useful to divide the dissertation by geographical areas 
because they are strongly influenced by the legislations and by the shareholders’ identity and 
composition. This part is about the laws and the most common practices that regulate the 
going private transactions, and wants to outline the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different ways available in order to understand which elements the management should 
consider in order to find the best solution for his specific company.  
After having review the existing literature, the second part of this dissertation gives a 
contribution to the lack of studies on the Italian phenomenon. The structure of Chapter IV 
recalls the organization of the first two chapters of the literature review: first, we analyse the 
companies that delist from Borsa Italiana between January 1995 and 30
th
 April 2015 (264 
companies) in order to provide a systematic picture of the Italian phenomenon. The intent 
is to underline in particular the differences and the similarities with other countries and with 
previous researches. Then, in the second paragraph, the study investigates the reasons and 
the consequences of PtP transactions using information gathered from financial statements 
of a subsample of Italian companies that went private from 2006 until 2012. The aim of this 
paragraph is twofold:  
1. We want to understand whether there are some financial indicators that distinguish 
delisted companies from companies that remain in Borsa Italiana. If we will be able to 
find such characteristics, we will have some clues on the issues that the companies are 
trying to solve trough the delisting. 
2. Given the scarcity of clarity about the impact of delisting in terms of performance, we 
want to examine how the financial statement items change after the delisting. 
Moreover, we want to ascertain whether the variations are actually due to the PtP 
transactions or if they are cause by other factors.  
Our results have two main limits: the first one is about the number of observations available 
in particular for the second part of the analysis of Chapter IV (28 observations). However, 
“this is an inherent problem in the going private research” (Michelsen et Klein, 2011, pp.57) 
due to the recent emergence of this phenomenon. Moreover, Italian stock exchange market 
trades a considerable fewer stocks than more developed markets. The second limit derives 
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from the difficulty to have access to some data, in particular about the information of the 
trading activity of the corporations before the delisting event. For these reasons, this 
dissertation should be regard as a starting point for next researches.   
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CHAPTER I: THE PHENOMENON OF DELISTING COMPANIES 
 
Delisting is quite a new phenomenon since the first delistings have been registered in the early 
1980s in the US markets. You (2008) counts 73.254 worldwide delisted companies until 
2008. During this period, delisting process has been driven by different reasons and 
characterized by different features. In addition, this chapter highlights that the Public-to-
Private transactions phenomenon in the Anglo-Saxon markets (the USA, Canada, and the US) 
is extremely different from the one in the European markets.  
1.1 DELISTING WAVES 
 
Figures 1.1a and 1.1b track the number of delisting companies in the US and in the UK until 
2002. They show that there have been periods characterized by a higher number of PtP 
transactions than others; indeed, many scholars (Bettinelli et al., 2011) describe delisting as a 
phenomenon that occurs in waves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first wave of delisting is observed in the United States in the 1980s. According to 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) between 1982 and 1989, 57% of listed US companies became 
Figure 1.1.a Number of PtP transactions (left hand scale) and the value in 
million USD (right hand scale) in the US between 1979-2002 
Source: Renneboog et Simons (2005), pp.4 
 
Figure 1.1.b Number of PtP transactions (left hand scale) and the value in 
million GBP (right hand scale) in the UK between 1979-2002 
Source: Renneboog et Simons (2005), pp.5 
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the targets of takeovers (mainly hostile takeovers) or were subjected to restructuring. The PtP 
transactions were mainly performed through LBOs, but the high level of debt involved and 
the absence of regulations produced many bankruptcies in the second half of the 1980s. The 
high number of companies’ failure triggered anti-takeover regulations, control over corporate 
high leverage, higher interests, and a credit crunch, which determined the end of the first PtP 
wave.  
The delisting phenomenon quickly reached the London Stock Exchange (the first 
management buyout is registered in 1985). Even if smaller in scale, the UK wave resembled 
the American one, with the peak also reached in 1989.  
The delisting trend decreased until the end of the 1990s, when both the US and the UK 
experienced a second going-private wave, which peaked in 1997. In both countries the 
total value of activity was lower than the previous period (USD 65 billion in 1997-2002 
compared with approximately USD 250 billion of the first wave (Renneboog et Simons, 2005; 
and Bettinelli et al., 2011)). The delisting’s increase this time was mainly due, on one hand, to 
small companies that could not benefit from the Regulated Markets because of the low trading 
volume (due to decrease in institutional investors’ coverage) and on the other hand to the 
introduction of unfavourable regulations that increase the costs of being listed (such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US). In addition, according to Renneboog and Simons (2005) 
another important determinant of the second wave had been the increased confidence of 
private equity and debt financiers that take over some companies. 
The end on the 1990s was also the period when PtP transactions emerged in the 
Continental Europe markets, since during the first wave they had only experienced the first 
cases of delisting companies (Figure 1.2). During this period, the total value of LBO activity 
in Europe was Euro 28 billion and from 1995 to 2005, 25% of European listed companies 
delist through LBOs and non-LBOs (Macey et O’Hara, 2008; Martinez et Serve, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to the UK, the PtP activity in the Continental Europe was less pronounced both in 
the number of deals and in the value. Several reasons for this difference have been 
Figure 1.2. Number of PtP 
transactions (left hand scale) 
and their value in million 
Euros (right hand scale) in 
Europe between 1979-2002 
Source: Renneboog et Simons 
(2005), pp.5 
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proposed by scholars. First of all, private equity firms were more reluctant to undertake the 
risky and costly delisting process. Secondly, the above graph does not distinguish between 
different European countries that actually behaved differently due to cultural influence. For 
instance, German managers usually are reluctant to list their companies because they do not 
recognize advantages; while Italian managers are proud if they are able to list their firms, and 
thus are less inclined to delist (Renneboog et Simons, 2005). Finally, as we will see in chapter 
II, European legal and fiscal regulations are less favourable to LBOs than the UK ones.  
The evidence that delisting occurs in waves has been theorized by Helwege and Liang (2004) 
which state that in periods when the markets are characterized by positive trends (hot market) 
there is a higher number of IPOs, and delisting occurs when markets is experiencing negative 
results (cold market). In other words, they suggest that when the economy is expanding, firms 
judge projects with higher expected cash flow, and usually investors are overoptimistic, thus 
companies have more incentive to list. On the other hand, different reasons can explain the 
higher number of delistings during cold market periods: during these periods markets are 
characterized by few underpricing, few cases of oversubscriptions, and large offerings: all 
elements that make survival more difficult. In addition, according to some scholars (Loughran 
et Ritter, 1994) the cold and hot market theory implies that the companies that enter the 
market during the hot phase are often characterized by managerial opportunism and investors 
irrationality, and therefore firms are not selected on the base of their quality at the time of 
IPOs, and that cause higher probability of delisting when markets slow down.  
Among the few researches that we have found about the phenomenon in the Italian market, 
figure 1.3 shows how the listing waves appear to be symmetrical to PtP transactions, 
suggesting that investors’ decisions are in part influenced to macro events that are more or 
less favourable to listing or delisting. This elaboration can be used to suppose the applicability 
of Helwege and Liang’s theory to the Italian context. The concept will be further debated in 
Chapter IV.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Delisting and Listing 
from Italian Stock Exchange 
Market 1975-2009 
Source: Bettinelli et al. (2011), pp.241 
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1.2 THE FEATURES OF DELISTING IN THE XXI CENTURY  
 
Starting from 2000, the public-to-private transactions become a more and more common 
process both in the US and Europe (see Table 1.1 and Figure 1.4). According to the research 
conducted by You (2008), 80% of the 73.254 worldwide delisted companies occurs after 
2000.  
 
Table 1.1: Delisting in some worldwide Stock Exchanges 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Nasdaq 121 717 906 873 700 815 535 
NYSE 98 171 194 254 286 215 145 
Toronto Stock Exchange 103 96 103 121 151 181 118 
Euronext 85 82 88 75 112 140 99 
London 320 235 292 336 299 287 261 
Spanish Exchange 35 40 61 63 62 0 33 
Swiss Exchange 20 21 20 32 24 25 20 
Tokyo 19 19 32 30 45 48 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One could argue that the higher number of delisted companies could be due to the increase in 
the absolute number of listed firms, but Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006) state that in the 
five year intervals between 2001-2005 the ratio between the number of delistings and listings 
rose over time. In the UK, the largest PtP transaction occurred in 2000 for a total value of £3.5 
billion IBO (Renneboog et Simons, 2005). On average, 12,3% of total companies that were 
Source: Geranio (2004), our elaboration 
Figure 1.4. Worldwide listing (left) and delisting (right) phenomenon outlook, 
2003-2010 
Source: Tutino et al. (2013), pp.59 
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traded in the London Stock Exchange were delisted every year during the period 1997-2008 
(Croci et Del Giudice, 2014).  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Also the Continental European markets experience a significant boost in the number of firms 
going private during the last decade; for instance, in Germany an average of 50 companies 
delist every year from 2000 to 2010 (Croci et Del Giudice, 2014). The peak of the activities of 
the XXI century mainly occurred during the years before the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
and 2010-2011 (Martinez et Serve, 2011).  
 
Different reasons are at the base of the going private phenomenon that dramatically increases 
during the XXI century. According to You (2008) and You et al. (2012) the main driving 
forces can be summarized as follow:  
a) CAPITAL MARKETS INEFFICIENCY. Higher price volatility and lower 
investors’ confidence due to the burst of the dot.com bubble and to the financial crisis 
of 2008 and 2011. These facts reduce that trade volumes and the stock’s performance.  
b) REGULATIONS. The introduction in many countries of more strict standards and 
requirements to be listed, which determine higher costs to be listed. In Europe, in 
addition, the introduction of new merger laws provides a stimulus to the PtP 
transactions. In Italy, for example, from 2003 thanks to a new legislation, the bidder 
can “use the target company’s assets to secure their debt” (Renneboog et Simons, 
2005, pp.6). 
It is important to note that the reasons at the ground of the phenomenon are very different 
according to the different markets. In mature and well established markets such as the USA, 
Canada and the UK, the delisting is most of the time involuntary. According to Djama et al. 
(2012) the primary reasons for this type of going private transactions are “the violation of 
stock exchange requirements” or “poor firm performance” (pp.9). On the other hand, in the 
Continental European markets, companies usually delist voluntarily, most of the time through 
Figure 1.5. Annual distribution of listed 
and delisted IPO companies in AIM 
during 1995-2012 
Source: Pour et Lasfer (2012) pp.4851 
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Buyout offer with squeeze-out (BOSO) or M&A activities. The differences between voluntary 
and involuntary delisting will be debated in more detail in Chapter III. 
 
Comparing the most important markets of Continental Europe countries and the ones of the 
US and the UK, Geranio (2004) concludes that the delisting phenomenon is more relevant in 
the latter, even taking into account the higher number of companies listed in these markets. 
According to him, the more pronounced impact in developed markets such as Nasdaq could 
be due to the less strict rules required to go public, which allow to list also low quality firms. 
Moreover, another explanation of the different level of delisting could be the fact that in the 
more active markets there is a higher number of foreign firms that over the last years delisted 
themselves in particularly from the US markets. Indeed, by the end of 2002, cross-listed 
companies had decrease to 50% relative of what it was in 1997 (Karolyi, 2006 cited in You et 
al., 2011).  
 
The current century is not only characterized by an increase in the number of public-to-private 
transactions, but also by important differences in the listing and delisting companies. As 
Figure 1.6 shows, during 1961-2006 foreign companies listed in the US experienced a decline 
in the length of listing time. During the 1980s, foreign companies on average stayed in a US 
exchange for 33 years, in 1996-00 foreign companies delist after 6 years (Chaplinsky et 
Ramchand, 2006). Looking at both domestic and foreign companies that are listed in the main 
USA markets, in 1980 about 98% of firms stayed in the market for more than 10 years, but 
the percentage decreases to 30% considering firms listed after 1990. The main reason for this 
steady and persistent shift seems to be the worst quality of the later entrants, both in terms of 
size and of performance, compared to early entrants. Other reasons that must be considered to 
explain this change are the burst of the dot.com bubble and the enforcement of stricter 
standards and regulations (even if this last point is countries’ dependent and cannot be applied 
indiscriminately worldwide).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.6. Duration of Listing in the US 
for Foreign Firms Listing from 1961-2006 
Source: Chaplinsky et Ramchand (2008), pp.18 
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There is a paucity of work on the impact of financial crisis on delisting process. However 
all scholars (Croci et Del Giudice, 2014; Ventoruzzo, 2010) forecast that the current financial 
turmoil should lead to an increase in the number of firms that go private since this strategy 
can be attractive for different reasons. Ventoruzzo (2010) explains that, on one hand, the 
financial crisis has reduced the availability of liquidity that is necessary to leveraged buyout. 
On the other hand, however, due to the declining stock market it could be cheaper for 
controlling shareholders or institutional investors to buy out minorities. If the price paid is 
fair, the deal could also be valuable for the minorities, who receive a higher consideration 
than what they would have received form the market. According to Gupta et al. (2013) during 
crisis the stock markets are “less efficient in incorporating firm-specific information” (pp.87) 
and, as we will see in Chapter II, this fact can be a reason for deciding to delist. The 2012 
vice-president of Aiaf (Associazione Italiana degli Analisti Fianziari), Antonio Tognoli, states 
that information is even more important in period of crisis, when investors want to invest in 
companies that have a credible plan to grow, and not in companies that raise capital in order 
to repay debt (Il Sole 24 Ore, 02/02/2012). In particular context, the problem is not only the 
lack of information, but also the absence of specialists able to guarantee liquidity in the 
market. This is the case, for example, of Italian small and mid-caps that are the more 
subjected to delisting process than bigger companies: almost 40% of the overall Italian trading 
is focused on large caps (Il Sole 24 Ore, 02/02/2012). Instead, Anglo-Saxon delisted 
companies are characterized by varied market capitalization. Finally, Ventoruzzo (2010) 
asserts that during crisis companies should be more willing to delist because of the 
uncertainty about future regulations and policy makers’ decisions. 
 
1.3 THE CROSS-DELISTING EVENT 
 
During the second half of the 1980s the increasing integration among worldwide capital 
markets promoted the spread of cross-listing. Cross-listing can be convenient (in particular if 
carried out in more active markets) for several reasons:  
 Portfolio diversification and therefore risk reduction;  
 Firms that cross-list in financial developed countries have access to a larger amount of 
foreign investments and thus more capital flows. Often the US markets allow to raise 
capital at lower costs; 
 The announcement of cross-listing in the US or the UK markets is usually welcomed 
with optimism by investors. According to the bonding hypothesis, when management 
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cross-lists the company in a more regulated market, investors appreciate the fact that 
the risks of agency costs diminish and they are more protected due to the stricter 
information requirements; 
 To use the cross listed shares for acquiring other companies;   
 Prestige; 
 Tax benefits 
Companies located in countries with poor regulations and less strict disclosure requirements 
usually benefit from cross-listing registering high abnormal return at the announcements 
(Witmer, 2005).  
However, in the late 1990s, when the markets experienced the second delisting wave, 
“international cross-listing started to lose some of its momentum” (You et al., 2011, pp.200). 
There are several explanations of this trend reversal.  
Concerning the US markets, the main reason seems to be the introduction of Sorbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. SOX legislation forces companies to stricter disclosure, increased 
corporate governance and accounting standards, in effect raising listing costs. In theory, the 
introduction of stricter regulations should guarantee higher quality of listed companies and 
stronger bonding. In practice, foreign firms have to evaluate if the additional regulatory 
requirements, and the associated costs, are worth the bonding benefit. The costs for 
compliance can be higher for foreign companies than for domestic ones because they should 
need to change some “organizational components of their daily operations in order to comply 
with SOX” (Daugherty et Georgieva, 2011, pp.209). On the other hand, US capital markets 
can be still attractive for firms from countries with weak investor protections that being listed 
in these markets bond themselves with stronger regulations. Moreover, the higher number of 
delisted companies from the US markets could be due to the fact that “the role of US 
institutions has been exaggerated” (Witmer, 2005, pp.5) or that the hosting country’s 
regulations have not been equally enforced against the cross-listed foreign firms. Indeed, You 
et al. (2011) do not find support to the bonding hypothesis. Moreover, multiple listing often 
creates liquidity problems, thus companies decide to delist from the market considered less 
strategic (that is often the foreign one).  
An additional dimension that must be taken into account as a factor that influences delisting 
decision of foreign firms is the cultural dimension. Culture distance and individualism of the 
home country have been indicated as a predictor of delisting decision (Daugherty et 
Georgieva, 2011). The former is related to the fact that companies usually list in markets that 
are culturally similar and that have similar language, business structure, and common history. 
The latter (measured by Hofstede’s index) is relevant because individualistic societies tend to 
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value more personal gain than the group’s success, causing a high risk of agency problems 
and hence a greater need of strong regulations: post-SOX, organizations from individualistic 
societies are less likely to delist.  
 
During the 1990s, 18 German companies cross-listed their shares on NYSE and NASDAQ; 
since 2000, however, 13 of the 18 cross listed German firms have delisted (Bessler et al., 
2012). In the table below, we have reported examples of justifications that some of these 
companies gave for cross-listing and subsequent delisting:  
 
Table 1.2: Examples of German companies that have cross-delisted from US markets 
COMPANY CROSS-LISTING 
STATEMENT 
CROSS-DELISTING 
STATEMENT 
  By listing BASF shares on the NYSE 
we are not only emphasizing our 
global orientation, but also broadening 
our shareholder base and creating 
additional strategic options for making 
acquisitions on the American market.  
Our decision to delist from the NYSE 
underlines BASF’s continuous efforts 
to reduce complexity and costs.  
 This listing creates a number of new 
advantages and opportunities for 
Bayer. For example, it gives us direct 
access to the US capital market. In 
addition, Bayer shares can now be 
used as a currency to finance possible 
acquisitions in the future. The listing 
also makes it easier for US 
stockholders to purchase Bayer shares, 
which is consistent with our goal of 
increasing the number of shareholders 
in that country. What’s more, the Wall 
Street listing gives Bayer the 
opportunity to initiate stock ownership 
programs for employees at our US 
subsidiaries. 
Bayer will maintain a high level of 
transparency in its reporting and thus 
continue to satisfy the requirements of 
international investors. Delisting and 
deregistration will enable us to 
achieve this with fewer formalities 
and therefore at lower cost.  
 
For major corporations active on an 
international level it is absolutely 
essential to be represented in all of the 
important capital markets. This is the 
only way to make sure that sufficient 
capital can be raised at acceptable 
cost. 
Our analyses have shown that a listing 
on the New York Stock Exchange 
does not offer Daimler any significant 
advantages that would justify the work 
and expense connected with the 
listing. 
 
 
Infineon’s IPO has provided the 
company an access to additional forms 
of financing. It has also given the 
company with an “acquisition 
currency”, available to finance 
acquisitions especially also in the 
USA. 
The Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
represents Infineon’s principal trading 
market, with trading on the NYSE 
accounting for a relatively low 
percentage of trading of its ADSs and 
ordinary shares on a worldwide basis. 
Infineon has therefore weighed the 
benefits of listing on the NYSE 
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against the associated costs and 
reached the decision that continuing 
the listing of the ADSs is no longer 
commercially justifiable.  
 
Accessing the US capital market will 
enhance our global visibility as we 
build Qimonda into the world’s 
leading creative memory company.  
NYSE Regulation announced today 
that it determined that the American 
Depositary Shares of Qimonda AG 
should be suspended immediately. 
This decision was reached in view of 
the fact that the Company announced 
on January 23, 2009, that Qimonda 
AG filed an application with the local 
court in Munich today to open 
insolvency proceedings. In addition, 
the Company was below compliance 
with the NYSE’s continued listing 
standards.  
 
This step [NYSE listing] is a 
reflection of our commitment to fulfil 
the demanding requirements posed by 
the international capital markets and 
to meet the need of North American 
investors, who own nearly 40% of the 
Company.   
Following a detailed cost/benefit 
analysis, we reached a decision at the 
end of May to delist from the NYSE 
as quickly as possible. Delisting is a 
necessary precondition for exemption 
from the reporting requirements 
specified by the US Security 
Exchange Act of 1934. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bessler et al., (2012). Our elaboration 
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CHAPTER II: REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF VOLUNTARY 
DELISTING 
 
According to the view of the majority (for instance Baharat et Dittmar, 2010), as the decision 
to list involves an analysis of the trade-off between the costs and the benefits of going public, 
the choice to delist usually occurs when the costs of listing exceed its benefits. On one hand, 
some scholars (Chaplinsky et Ramchard, 2008) suggest that the entry characteristics of the 
firms influence the probability that they will survive or not in the Exchange markets. In other 
words, the companies must have a “sufficient quality to realize the expected benefits” 
(Chaplinsky et Ramchard, 2008, pp.3). On the other hand, the delisting waves described in the 
previous chapter suggest that the overall economic conditions and national markets’ 
characteristics have a relevant weight in the costs-benefits balance. For example, Geranio 
(2004) analyses a sample of Italian delisted companies over time, and concludes that often 
companies decide to go public without a long term strategy, but simply to take advantage of 
temporarily positive trends in the public markets. In the first paragraphs of this chapter we 
want to analyse both these factors: we describe the more mentioned delisting hypotheses and 
we analyse if they are supported by empirical studies and/or under which circumstances they 
are verified. 
A wide range of reasons for going private has been presented by different scholars. We decide 
to follow the general framework provided by Tutino et al. (2013) that ranked the different 
reasons into three different streams, and we combine it with further studies.  
The three main streams are:  
a) Traditional incentives related 
b) Agency theory 
c) Financial structure 
The first group is usually common to all types of PtP transactions, the latter two usually differ 
by geographical location and way of delisting (see Diagram 2.1, pp.28).  
After these three clusters we have added a fourth motivation, which considers the delisting 
decision as a defensive strategy against hostile takeovers. Diagram 2.2 (pp.29) gives a 
schematic view of the different hypotheses.  
 
The second part of the chapter is devoted to analyse what are the consequences of the 
delisting. In other words we are interested in understanding if the benefits expected from the 
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deal actually appear or if the going-private transactions must be considered as a traumatic 
event for the company.  
2.1 TRADITIONAL INCENTIVES RELATED 
 
LIQUIDITY HYPOTHESIS & FINANCIAL VISIBILITY 
Since one of the main reasons driving firms to go public is the possibility to access liquidity, 
if this benefit decreases, the firm will be more likely to go private. Many firms go public to 
fund their growth opportunities; for example, if the firm has already reached his maximum 
line of credit, but needs capital in order to finance positive NPV projects. Witmer (2005) 
argues that companies are more likely to delist when the availability of liquidity decreases 
because liquidity is negatively correlated with the firm’s bid-ask spread, and thus with the 
valuation of the firm.  
 
The liquidity reduction can be due to the low financial visibility, an indicator that many 
economists suggest as a measure to forecast the probability for the delisting of a company. 
Indeed, “firms with decrease in analyst coverage, institutional ownership and turnover are 
more likely to go private” (Tutino et al., 2013, pp.219). Visibility is necessary to create 
consensus, credibility, and transparency in the markets upon the company and thus to increase 
the shareholder base. Financial visibility also reduces the stock price volatility (Pour et Lasfer, 
2013). Moreover, financial visibility and the requirement for enhanced transparency should 
“enables firms to have a greater bargaining power with banks, resulting in lower borrowing 
constraints and diversification of sources of financing” (Pour et Lasfer, 2013, pp.4852).  
 
Firms may also decide to delist if they do not need liquidity anymore. According to the life 
cycle stage theory, mature companies that decide to delist can avoid the costs of being listed, 
while financing the few investing opportunities by internal capital generation or low cost debt. 
The funding costs can be particularly low for these companies since “they may benefit for an 
easier assets assessment which can be used as security for debt financing” (Tutino et al., 
2006, pp.220).  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Pour et Lasfer (2013) conduct a research on 380 voluntary delisted companies from the 
London Stock Exchange in 1995-2009 and they conclude that many of these firms have 
decided to list in order to rebalance their capital structure, but they failed to raised equity 
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capital in the markets, and this fact leads to delist. As figure 2.1 shows, the result is supported 
by the observation that, on average, the companies that will delist are over-leveraged when 
they are public because they had to use debt to finance their investment. Even if someone 
could argue that the leverage is due to losses, the hypothesis is not supported by the fact that 
ROA of the voluntary delisted firms does not shows significant differences with the ROA of 
control firms. The same result is also supported by Tutino et al. (2013) according to whom 
also the Italian delisted firms are marked by a high capital needs since they show higher 
leverage compared with control sample. Looking at the European markets in general, 
according to Pour et Lasfer (2013) firms delist “to enhance their bargaining power with banks 
and to reduce their leverage, while firms that are not able to rebalance their leverage decide to 
go private” (pp.4852).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tutino et al. (2013) also find that Italian firms that decide to delist are usually operating in 
mature markets that experience slow growth, supporting the idea that in these sectors 
companies do not require high liquidity because of the absence of profitable projects.  
Looking at the financial visibility hypothesis, Witmer (2005) reports that foreign companies 
that decide to list in the US increase their shareholder base by 29%. As a consequence, the 
reason of lack of analysis coverage seems not to be applicable in the case of larger regulated 
markets. Partially in contrast with Witmer’s article, Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2008) suggest 
that the capability of the US market to attract analysts’ interest could decreases as the number 
of listed foreign firms increases over time and “the rarity value of foreign new lists diminish 
and the threshold for uniqueness could increase” (pp.3).  
When the number of listed companies increases, another dimension that influences the 
visibility is the firms’ dimension. Low visibility is usually a characteristic of smaller firms, 
since the costs of research for these companies is too high in comparison to their marginal 
Figure 2. 2. Trends in firms' characteristics in post-IPO 
period 
Source: Pour et Lasfer (2013), pp.4856 
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market share. According to Geranio (2004) who reports a survey conducted by Business 
Week (August, 1999), companies traded in Wall Street with capitalization between $50 and 
250 million, were followed by 2.5 analysts, while companies with a capitalization above $250 
million, had a coverage of 10 analysts.  
 
RISK SHARING HYPOTHESIS 
In addition to have access to liquidity, another benefit of listed companies is the risk sharing. 
Trading in the Exchanges is a good alternative when the assets’ idiosyncratic risk is high 
and the owner is either sufficiently risk adverse or sufficiently optimistic about the assets’ 
expected return. Looking at the assets’ specific risk, when it is low and being listed does not 
provide risk-sharing through portfolio diversification, the company may prefer to go 
private. In addition, the lower the owners’ risk aversion the lower the benefits of risk 
reduction and consequently the higher the costs linked to be listed.  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Beker and Pollet (2008) validate the risk sharing hypothesis for US companies that decide to 
go private through LBO. Martinez and Serve (2011) find that firms with low beta risk 
(commonly used as a measure of idiosyncratic risk) are more likely to experience PtP 
transactions, concluding that risk sharing hypothesis is one of the main determinants of 
delisting decision.  
This motivation seems to be the more relevant in the case of family businesses, which are 
high risk adverse but cannot eliminate idiosyncratic risk through portfolio diversification. 
Therefore, they decide to go public to share the risk with minority shareholders when the risk 
is high, and delist when risk is low.  
 
These first reasons that can be at the base of the decision to delist are mainly linked to the 
decrease in benefits that a firm has planned to gain from the Exchange. The following 
reasons, on the other hand, lead to costs increase for the company.  
 
UNDERVALUATION HYPOTHESIS 
The undervaluation hypothesis is based on the adverse selection problem due to asymmetric 
information between managers and investors that is wider in public markets. In the equity 
markets, corporate managers have access to most inside information
1
 and thus can buy 
                                                             
1 Inside information can be defined as material information about the value of a security that is not available to 
public traders (Larry, H., 2003).  
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shares when they know that the stock prices are undervalued in order to gain private benefits 
at the expense of the other less informed shareholders. This problem can negatively impact 
firm’s quality and the share price (increasing bid/ask spread), thus shareholders may decide to 
delist to avoid the transaction costs’ increase. According to this hypothesis, companies will 
delist when market prices do not fully reflect the real value of the firm. Shares that are less 
liquid are more likely to be undervalued. 
Another way through which uninformed investors could be hurt by the private information 
that managers have, is during the listing and delisting process. Lamba and Khan (1999) 
suggest that insiders act on their private information before exchange listing and delisting in 
order to gain private benefits. In other words, since it has been verified that exchange markets 
usually react positively (negatively) to the announcement of an imminent IPO (delisting), it 
could happen that corporate insiders who know of a formal listing (delisting) application 
before its announcement buy (sell) stocks to their own benefit.  
However, Boot et al. (2006) are sceptical about the explanation for PtP transactions based on 
insider information, indeed they argue that “if this undervaluation is due to the manager 
possessing private information, then going private is rather drastic way to deal with a possibly 
ephemeral situation” (pp.809) and suggest that a tender offer repurchase may be a less costly 
solution to the problem.  
Regarding the undervaluation hypothesis, it is also important to underline that the negative 
influence of insiders over stocks prices is partially attenuated because in many jurisdiction 
insider trading is illegal. Even if “enforcing insider-trading laws is quite difficult” (Larry 
Harris, pp. 588), it is likely that managers weight the trade-off between benefits and penalties 
when decide to trade on their private information.  
 
The adverse selection also leads to the so called lemons principle (Akerlof, 1970). This 
principle states that, whenever a seller has private information about the value of a good, the 
buyers will discount the price in order to recover the risk. Due to the information asymmetry, 
investors expect that managers sell their shares only when they are overvalued, so investors 
will be willing to buy only at a lower price to reflect the possibility that managers know bad 
news. The lemon principle creates a cost for companies that want to raise money for new 
investments and diminish the advantage to be public in order to raise new financing capital.  
 
Finally, in addition to the reduced shareholders’ value due to asymmetric information, it could 
also happen that managers themselves decide to delist the company if they believe that it is 
undervalued and that it can be developed with greater freedom once went private.  
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EMPITICAL EVIDENCE 
Bettinelli et al. (2011) support the undervaluation hypothesis reporting a study on a sample of 
US companies conducted by Maupin et al. (1984) that found that companies which went 
private had a lower price-to book ratio then the other companies. However, according to Croci 
and Del Giudice (2014), the stocks’ undervaluation is not caused by controlling shareholders 
exploiting private information at the expense of minority investors, indeed the operating 
performance of firms that go private because of an offer of their controlling shareholders, 
remain stable after delisting.  
Looking at the characteristics of Italian market, undervaluation seems to be a possible cause 
of delisting even if not the main one. 
 
TRANSACTION COSTS HYPOTHESIS 
The second type of costs’ increase is due to the high fixed costs to trade in the Regulated 
Markets. The so called transaction costs hypothesis (Renneboog et Simons, 2005) suggests 
that for many small firms the amortization of direct and indirect costs has become 
unbearable and thus they have been forced to delist. Direct costs are the ongoing costs 
following the IPO, i.e. the costs of registration and underwriting fees; indirect costs include 
information production costs, the compliance costs to meet regulatory and corporate 
governance standards, and opportunity costs. On average, PwC (2012) estimates that 
companies incur $1 million on one-time costs in order to convert the organisation from a 
private to a public company, and $1.5 million of recurring costs as a result of being public
2
.  
Recently, the regulations on corporate governance have increased both in the US and in 
Europe, increasing the costs of compliance. For instance, for the US, the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 is frequently seen as a reason that pushes firms to go private. 
This act introduces new disclosure costs, auditing standards, and criminal penalties for 
governance fraud.  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Most studies (Pour et Lasfer, 2013; Bettinelli et al., 2011) on the American and European 
Markets find support for the transaction costs hypothesis in the fact that voluntary delisted 
companies are usually small in size (using the market value of equity as a proxy). However, 
the relationship seems to be weak. Also in country such as Italy where the small size of the 
firms is likely to result in higher costs in percentage, “costs savings will probably be 
appreciated but cannot lead to a going private transaction” (Bettinelli et al., 2011, pp.237).  
                                                             
2
 This valuation does not include the costs associated to the IPO process.  
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In the recent years, many scholars have focused their researches on the impact of SOX, 
however the actual role of the increasing regulations on the process of delisting is still not 
clear. On one hand, according to Marosi and Massoud (2007) the introduction of SOX is one 
of the major determinants of PtP transactions in the US. On the other hand, Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand (2007) suggest that SOX alone cannot lead to the decision to delist, but that the 
rationale for delisting must be found in “a combination of factors affecting the relative 
attractiveness of the US and home market” (pp.6).  
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 2 AGENCY THEORY 
 
This second group of motivations interprets the decision to delist as a way to get the manager 
to act in the best interest of the shareholders. Managers are the agents of shareholders, and 
they are incentivized to increase the firm size beyond its optimal level. The larger the firm, 
the larger managers’ power (the so called empire building), and higher growth usually is 
associated with increase in managers’ compensations.  
From the agency theory, three main hypotheses can be at the base of public-to-private 
transaction: free cash flow hypothesis, control hypothesis, and incentive realignment 
hypothesis. 
 
FREE CASH FLOW HYPOTHESIS 
According to this hypothesis, the delisting decision decreases the risk that managers will 
invest in unprofitable projects, especially in those markets that have low growth 
opportunities. Managers could invest in projects with negative NPV in order to enlarge the 
company, or could invest FCF at below the cost of capital. Some scholars (Bettinelli et al., 
2011) suggest that, since the PtP transactions often involved high leverage level (especially in 
Figure 2.3. Trends in firms' characteristics in post-IPO 
period 
Source: Pour et Lasfer (2013), pp.4856 
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case of LBO transactions), managers are incentivized to handle the company in a more 
effective way since they have less liquidity. In other words, indebtedness increases the firms’ 
value because a part of the FCF must be used to repay debt (Berk and DeMarzo, 2012).  
Moreover, conflicts of interest may also arise when the investors would prefer that free cash 
flow is distributed as dividends, instead then kept in the company or invested in unprofitable 
projects (payout policies). Jensen (1986) points out that the issuing of debt in exchange for 
stock can be considered as an alternative substitute of dividends. In this way, managers are 
obliged to respect their promise to pay out future cash flow because otherwise shareholders 
recipients of the debt “have the right to take the firm into bankruptcy court if managers do not 
maintain their promise to make the interest and principle payments” (Jensen, M.C., 1986, 
pp.324).  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
According to the researches that we have reviewed, all agency theory’ hypotheses are strongly 
influenced by ownership differences between the Anglo-saxon markets and the Continental 
Europe markets.  
The free cash flow hypothesis holds in the American and in the UK markets, but does not 
hold in the Continental Europe and in particular in Italy. The first main difference is that 
Public companies in the US and UK usually have a lot of shareholders that own small 
portions of equity. On the other hand, in Continental Europe the ownership structure of 
companies is generally characterized by a large dominant shareholder whose stake is almost 
“twice as large as that on Anglo-Saxon LBO targets” (Tutino et al., 2003, pp.219) and who  
exercises significant control. In addition, one of the peculiarities of the Italian market is that 
most of the time there is not an actual separation between ownership and management. For 
these reasons, in the Continental Europe and in Italy there is no benefits to go private for 
efficiency reasons and thus it seems that the FCF hypothesis does not hold (Bettinelli et al., 
2011; Tutino et al., 2003). On the other hand, the studies on the London Exchange markets 
reveal that, compared to the control firms, voluntary delisted companies have lower growth 
opportunities (Pour et Lasfer, 2013), suggesting that these firms experience difficulties in 
finding profitable projects in which invest their excess FCF and so they have higher risk of 
underinvestment managers’ attitude.  
 
CONTROL HYPOTHESIS 
Another issue correlated with the agency theory is the control hypothesis that is related to the 
problem of monitoring managerial actions. Public companies are usually owned by a 
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multitude of investors, each of which has only a minority stake. Disperse shareholder 
structure may lead to underinvest in monitoring activities (Reeneboog et Simons, 2005). 
According to Ventoruzzo (2010) this problem nowadays is even more severe since the 
increased use of derivative instruments, which require high skills in order to be monitored. 
Going private, equity ownership is reunified in fewer hands that usually have more interest 
and capability to monitor managers’ work. In some cases, the reunification of control can 
resolve agency problems.  
Thus, if public governance is so slack that permits excessive managerial autonomy, investors 
prefer private ownership. However, according to the bonding hypothesis (Coffee, 1999), 
when a company is listed, the management bonds itself to a better governance regime because 
it is subject to more restrictive monitoring and to higher probability to be caught.  
Boot et al. (2006) demonstrate how the contrary is also true: if in the Exchange Markets 
regulations and investors impose too heavy restrictions to managers’ autonomy or are 
considered too intrusive, the managers themselves should favour private ownership structure 
because it allows to contract decisions with few large investors and because it is easier to 
accept only shareholders “whose views about optimal decisions are aligned with those of 
managers” (Boot et al., 2006, pp.806). 
 
Another cost of the control hypothesis is that, since the control is lower when ownership is 
not concentrated, the risk that a manager is fired is not significant, thus manager is more 
willing to pursue its own interest instead that company interest. The so called management 
entrenchment suggests that, in addition to the lower risk to be discovered that characterizes 
private companies, managers of public companies may invest in assets which have a higher 
value under him control than under an alternative manager. As a result, since replacing the 
current manager becomes even more expensive, they “can extract from shareholders higher 
compensation, in the form of higher salary or grater discretionary behaviour” (Shleifer et 
Vishny, 1989, pp.124). The higher level of debt typical of private firms will reduce 
management entrenchment because it is more likely that with a collapse the managers lose 
their work.    
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Also in this case, the strength of the hypothesis is strongly influenced by the different 
geographical markets.  
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First of all, as we have already said, US and UK companies have a lot of shareholders that 
generally own small portions of equity, which means that the interest in management 
monitoring is low. In such cases, going private allows for a more concentrated ownership and 
thus shareholders are more interested in the supervision of management activities.  
Secondly, the incentive for the controlling shareholders for delisting depends on their identity. 
In particular, one of the key characteristics of Italian firms is that they are family owned. 
Families are more concerned about company control and they want to maximize private 
benefits not available to minority investors. In addition, families are usually risk-adverse. As a 
consequence, Italian firms (but also Continental Europe ones) go private when threats for 
their control increase, as can happen when companies are small and undervalued, since they 
are more likely to be the target for an hostile acquisition (Tutino et al., 2013).  
The studies on the bonding hypothesis are mixed. Witmer (2005) finds that, consistent with 
the bonding hypothesis, Nasdaq-listed companies are more likely to cross-delist. However, he 
also finds that “firms from countries with poorer investor protection, and firms with the Post-
SOX period are more likely to delist” (pp.29), which is in contrast to the bonding hypothesis. 
We can assert that this hypothesis depends from country to country because it is influenced by 
the national regulations. For instance, in the US regulation is drafted in order to regulate 
unsolicited takeover and thus management may decide to delist in order to have more 
freedom; on the other hand, in the UK the markets are more self-regulated, favouring “the 
unrestricted functioning of market forces” (Renneboog et Simons, 2005, pp.31).  
 
INCENTIVE REALIGNMENT HYPOTHESIS 
Different stakeholders of a company usually have different incentives to keep the organization 
as a going concern. These incentives can be considered the result of the possession of private 
benefits (for instance reputation, control, the value expropriated from shareholders, and 
salary). When managers sell parts of the claims to outsiders, the divergence of interests 
between shareholders and managers increases and managers may increase their private 
benefits at the expense of firm’s value. A PtP transaction allows for reunification of 
ownership and control and, as a consequence, “will improve the incentive structure and is 
expected to increase managerial motivations and efforts to maximize firm value” (Renneboog 
et al., 2007, pp.7).  
However, many scholars (Renneboog et al., 2007, Franks et Nyborg, 1996) highlight that the 
actual contribution of the incentive realignment hypothesis to the decision to going private is 
controversial because entrenchment effect may render managers immune to organizational 
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change. For example, the switching costs of changing job, or the risks of lower salaries in case 
of poor management, may incentive managers to take decisions that maximize the value of the 
firm.  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Since the ownership structure of most Continental European firms is characterized by a large 
dominant shareholder, the incentive realignment hypothesis is weaker in this context and 
especially in Italy where most of the times dominant shareholders exceed 50% (Bettinelli et 
al., 2011). Tutino et al. (2013) suggests that the incentive alignment and monitoring role 
motivations of going private in Continental Europe is more likely driven by the will to resolve 
conflicts between large and minority shareholders, rather than between shareholders and 
management. For instance, going private family controlling shareholders eliminate the 
probability that minority shareholders may sell their shares to hostile acquirers.  
 
 2.3 FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
 
The third main issue investigated by scholars refers to the benefits that a delisted company 
may gain in terms of financial structure.  
 
TAX BENEFITS HYPOTHESIS 
Tax benefits that can arise from the leverage entails in a LBO transaction is often seen as a 
key factor in driving the decision to going private (Tutino et al., 2013; Reeneboog et Simons, 
2005). The large amount of debt used to finance this type of transaction can generate 
significant interest deductions. The annual gain for interest deduction can be calculated as 
follow:  
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 × 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 
Looking at the formula, it is clear that the wealth gain strongly depend on the country’s 
fiscal regime and the marginal tax rates that the company is subject to. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that if the shareholders of the listed company will be 
also the owners of the delisted company and thus the lenders of the LBO process, the 
deduction benefit is partially diminished because the interest income increases their taxable 
basis as individuals.  
Another important limit on the possibility to exploit the tax benefits that may be gained 
through delisting process is about the capability of the company to use all the deductions, 
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which is not always possible. In order to benefit from the tax shield, a company must have 
taxable income; if interests regularly exceed EBIT, there are no tax benefits. Nevertheless, 
this observation is probably more a theoretical issue than a practical one, because in many 
countries (such as in the US) companies can carry back net operating losses occurred after the 
LBO in order to “offset taxable income earned in the three years before the buyout. […] or 
can be carried forward to offset future taxable income to up to 15 years” (Kaplan, 1989, 
pp.625). Tutino et al. (2006) suppose that due to interest deduction, companies “pay almost 
no tax for a long period” (pp.219). On the other hand, Kaplan (1989) argues that “a public 
company could obtain many of the tax benefits without going private” (pp.613). 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
As we have argued analysing the formula of tax shield, the tax benefit hypothesis does not 
hold everywhere. Scholars agree that in the US there are great tax advantages of using debt 
sourcing (Bettinelli et al., 2011), but that in the UK these advantages are smaller.  
In Italy, even if empirical studies on the topic have not been carried out yet, it seems that 
regulations are not in favour of companies that choose to delist (if we do not take into account 
the fiscal avoidance policies that private companies can conduct because of the lower 
transparencies regulations).   
DIVIDEND HYPOTHESIS 
This theory is based on the “rules” that if companies do not want to see a reduction in their 
shares’ price, they have to pay regular and high dividends, otherwise investors would look 
for more remunerative companies. Most of the market’s participants will not appreciate 
companies that retain profits, even if this strategy is required in order to finance projects 
during period of high growth (Geranio, 2004). Going private, companies can decide to 
reinvest their profit without facing the risk of shares’ price undervaluation and reduces the 
conflict between dividends long term strategies.  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
There are very few researches that verify the extent by which the dividend hypothesis is 
actually a reason of delisting. Given the fact that this motivation is seldom cited in the 
literature, we suppose that it is not one of the main reasons. Our conclusion is supported by a 
sample of Italian delisting companies analysed by Tutino et al. (2013) that shows that they do 
not pay higher dividends when they are in the Regulated Markets and that they are 
characterized by policies of retaining earnings.  
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Traditional incentive related 
•liquidity hypothesis and financial visibility 
•risk sharing hypothesis 
•undervaluation hypothesis 
•transaction costs hypothesis 
Agency theory 
•free cash flow hypothesis 
•control hypothesis 
•incentive realignment hypothesis 
Financial structure 
•tax benefits hypothesis 
•dividend hypothesis 
Takeover defense hypothesis 
Diagram 2.1: Validity of agency cost and financial structure’s hypotheses in different 
markets. 
HYPOTHESIS 
ANGLO-SAXON 
MARKETS 
EUROPEAN MARKETS 
Free cash flow hypothesis   
Control hypothesis   
Incentive realignment 
hypothesis 
  
Tax benefits hypothesis US  UK  
Dividend hypothesis   
 
 2.4 TAKEOVER DEFENSE HYPOTHESIS 
 
PtP transactions can be considered as a strategy of last resort in order to protect the company 
from a hostile tender offer. In this case the process of delisting can be initiated by 
shareholders or by managers if they fear to lose their jobs after the takeover.  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
Since the existence of majority owners and large shareholders decreases the probability that 
unrelated bidders are able to take over the company or that private equity can acquire it, the 
takeover defence hypothesis is probably the less applicable motivation in the Italian context. 
This reasoning is also supported by the fact that in Italy the majority of PtP transactions are 
concluded by the same owner that controls the company before the listing process. 
Diagram 2.2: Summary of delisting’s reasons 
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2.5 IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES OF DELISTING 
 
After having understood the main reasons that push a company to delist, this paragraph 
reviews the existing literature on the consequences of delisting in order to realize if it is 
actually valuable. In other words, we want to study whether the benefits expected by listed 
companies when they decide to delist have been meet or not. According to our researches, 
scholars focused more on ex-ante analysis of the phenomenon rather than on ex-post studies. 
Indeed, we found few articles about the consequences and most of them are about involuntary 
delisting or LBOs. In particular, the deals promoted by existing shareholders are seldom 
analysed.  
It is first of all important to distinguish the impact caused by voluntary and involuntary 
delisting. In general term, in fact, voluntary delisting has positive outcomes for the firm 
and for the shareholders; on the other hand, involuntary delisting usually has negative 
economic consequences. Since involuntary delisting is not the main topic of this paper, we 
show just a summary of most important results about it; and we focus more in detail on 
voluntary delisting.  
INVOLUNTARY DELISTING  
To analyse the consequences of involuntary delisting, many scholars focus their attention on 
the impact that the delisting announcement has on the market, mainly in terms of impact on 
stock prices, volume, spread, and volatility. 
All surveys reviewed reported that the impact of the announcement of an involuntary delisting 
is a traumatic event for the firm and for the investors. Different explanations can help to 
explain the loss of value. One of the possible reasons can be the decrease in liquidity and 
marketability caused by the exit from the Stock Exchange. Another explanation can be the 
negative signal that the exchange agents’ decision to delist the firm has on the company’s 
quality. Indeed, since involuntary delisting usually is due to companies’ poor performance, it 
is considered a bad news by shareholders. Meera et al. (2000) document that in some Asian 
markets, the value of equity declines by 8.5% on the announcement day. They also report that 
according to data, the fall in value is not recovered in the subsequent periods, suggesting that 
the negative impact is permanent. In addition, according to Macery et al. (2008) the 
detrimental effects are particularly evident looking at the trend of the spread. Since they 
analyse a sample of firms delisted from the NYSE that move to the non-regulated Pink Sheet 
market, they have been able to compare the average percentage spreads before and after the 
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delisting (Chapter III will face the issue of the trading on over the counter markets after the 
delisting). They find that the spread increases from 5.84 percent pre-delisting to 15.31 percent 
post-delisting. Also Angel et al. (2004), using different proxies, verify that involuntary 
delisting is associated with lower liquidity:  
 Volumes decline by 2/3 
 Quoted spread almost triple (from 12,1% to 33,6%) 
 Effective spread triples (from 3,3% to 9,9%) 
 Volatility more than triples (from 4,4% to 14,3%) 
Regarding the cross-delisting phenomenon, when the company is delisted from a foreign 
market where its shares were heavily traded, the volume of stocks traded in the local market 
increases significantly (Meera et al., 2000).  
Obviously, it is important to underline that the impact on the stocks is linked to the reason that 
determines the delisting, with the case of bankruptcy leading to the worst decline in market 
quality (Harris et al., 2008).  
 
However, analysing the consequences of involuntary delisting it is important to consider also 
the impact on the economy as a whole. In effect, even if firms can be harmed by the delisting, 
the effects on other parties can be mixed:  
 The Exchanges may increase profits because infrequently traded stocks that are 
expansive to trade are eliminated; on the other hand revenues may decrease because of 
the elimination of trading opportunities. The Exchanges also benefit from a reputation 
point of view.  
 Current investors undergo a reduction in liquidity as a consequence of delisting; but 
potential investors are favoured because they can be surer about the firms’ quality.  
 Issuers are negatively affected because the increase in spread and volatility and the 
reduction in volume traded boost the cost of capital.  
 Brokerage firms. In the event of cross-delisting, the higher level of activities in the 
home market can increase revenues in other industries, such as in the brokerage sector.  
 
VOLUNTARY DELISTING 
Common measures used by the existing literature to understand the shareholders’ wealth 
creation after voluntary delisting are the average premium paid to pre-delisting 
shareholders (the difference in the firm value at the beginning and at the end of the 
transaction) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the day when the delisting is 
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announced. The premium represents the additional value that the firm is expected to produce 
once it goes private; instead the CAR is useful to understand the effects that information has 
on the firm’s value and includes the probability that a bid can fail.  
According to the results reviewed by Serve et al. (2012) the companies delisted from Anglo-
Saxon markets usually have a premium higher than 40%, while the European transactions’ 
premium is about 21%. Moreover, all studies analysed report positive CARs around the 
announcement, even if their value depends on the length of the event window considered: 
+9.60% in the window (-1; +1) and +21.82% in the longer event window (-30; +30) (Croci et 
Del Giudice, 2014). In the case of LBOs, the highest impact on share price is usually 
registered “one day before until one day after the event date” (Renneboog et Simons, 2005, 
pp.18). Also in this case, the CARs are lower in Continental European countries.  
These results support the hypothesis of wealth gain for shareholders from going private 
transactions. But where do these benefits come from? According to the empirical literature, 
there are three main sources of gain, which refer to some of the hypotheses that have been 
presented as reasons for delisting: 
a) TAX BENEFITS. As noted in the previous paragraphs, voluntary delisting is often 
performed through mechanisms that involve high level of debt (especially in the case 
of LBOs, as the next chapter will explain) and thus interest payments which are tax 
deductible. However, it is important to remark that this source of benefits depends on 
the fiscal regime, the marginal tax rate, and the way through which delisting is carried 
out. For instance, analysing Western European PtP transactions, Boubaker et al. 
(2014) do not find that tax incentive has any significant impact on shareholders 
wealth.  
b) ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION and AGENCY PROBLEMS. Asymmetric 
information between managers and investors determines a misalignment between the 
market price of the shares and the true value of the firm (undervaluation). It is quite 
obvious that the current shareholders will sell their shares only if they will receive 
more than the current market price, thus causing high premiums.  
Several scholars suggest that the wealth gain mainly comes from the reduction of 
the costs associated with agency theory. Zahra (1995) states that the benefits are due 
to the incentive realignment. Gou et al. (2011) show that the increase in cash flow, net 
of tax benefits, is higher for the companies that increase their debt because of the 
buyout. This observation can be explained through the “benefits of debt in reducing 
agency costs” (pp.479). Also Boubaker et al. (2014) argue that the reduction in agency 
problems between dominant and minority shareholders is one of the main sources of 
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benefits, in particularly in Western European markets. They come to this conclusion 
after having observed that when the listed companies had a higher separation between 
cash-flow and control rights, CARs and premium were higher. In addition, they also 
strengthen their results highlighting that the parameters used to measure operating 
performance were lower in the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) prior to 
the going-private transaction. A possible explanation of this data is that MLS are more 
efficient in monitoring the allocation of rare resources, therefore there is “less room 
for operating performance improvements after the buyout” (Boubaker et al., 2014, 
pp.227). These findings are partially rejected by the studies of Croci and Del Giudice 
(2014) that focus their analysis on the performance of family firms and those delisted 
by large shareholders, showing that in these cases the performance does not increase. 
The result suggests that the hypothesis that controlling shareholders could take the 
company private in order to exploit future better performance because they have more 
information is not verified. In other words, the identity of the pre-delisting owners 
does not determine the change in operating performance.  
c) OPERATING PERFORMANCE. For instance, the firm could gain benefits through 
increased profitability and efficiency, elimination of worthless assets, or strategic 
acquisitions. The impact that delistings have on operating performance is not clear 
and scholars provided mixed evidence. On one hand, some studies reported an 
increase in performance looking at index such as ROA or operating margin (Cumming 
et al., 2007; Kaplan et Stromberg, 2009). Renneboog and Simons (2005) document 
that analysing the accounting variables, the increase in operating performance in these 
cases comes mainly from cost cutting, rather than from more revenues. According to 
Jones (1992) the increased in performance is due to the modification of the 
organizational structure because going private companies are able to better tailor the 
strategy with the company’s context.  
Kaplan (1989) documents mixed results that depend on the situation of the firm before 
the delisting. In particular, looking at a sample of MBOs that took place during 1980-
86, he affirms that capital expenditures usually decrease after buyout, validating the 
hypothesis of managers’ empire building tendencies in firms that had high free cash 
flow before the going private transactions. This result is also confirmed by Boubaker 
et al. (2014) focusing on going private transactions in some European countries. 
However, Kaplan (1989) also notices that the reduction in capital expenditures for 
companies that did not generate high FCF is more likely to be due to problems derived 
from debt burden. Finally, Croci and Del Giudice (2014) try to understand the 
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elements that determine the change operating performance of delisted companies, 
measured through the variation of ROA pre- and post-delisting. They conclude that 
the identity of who carries out the transaction (existing shareholders or external 
individuals) does not influence the operating result.  
It is evident that there is no a unanimous understanding neither on the positive or 
negative impact on performance, nor on the source of operating improvement. These 
inconsistencies among analyses can be partially explained because of the different 
measures that can be used to assess the operating performance. For instance, a 
company that, after delisting, sells its non-productive assets does not change EBITDA 
on sales, but the return on assets (ROA) increases.   
It is important to notice that the three sources of gain in the reality overlap. For example, if 
the delisting is carried out through high level of debt, the cash flow benefits of lower taxes, 
and also of better governance due to the discipline of debt (monitoring by the financial 
sponsor, concentrated ownership, etc.).  
 
Substantial less academic research focuses on abnormal returns for bondholders. Exceptions 
are Baran and King (2010). They argue that pre-delisting bondholders suffer negative returns 
at going private announcements, and that these losses are partially due to the wealth transfer 
effects from bondholders to stockholders. Anyway, it is important to know that the 
bondholders and deal’s characteristics are fundamental elements to consider when forecasting 
the potential abnormal negative returns. For instance, bondholders losses are significant when 
the management is the acquirer; in effect, in this case management tends to be more aligned 
with shareholders, but the resulting asset substitution and riskier investments can be 
detrimental for bondholders. On the other hand, bondholders can be protected if they have 
some kind of covenants, such as change of control covenants
3
 (Asquith et Wizman, 1990).  
 
Another important aspect to judge the efficiency of the delisting process is the impact that it 
has on employment level. According to our literature reviewed (Kaplan, 1989; Muscarella et 
Vetsuypens, 1990; Renneboog et Simons, 2005), going private transactions do not cause 
reduction in the workforce. On the contrary, Kaplan (1989) documents that on average 
employment rises by 0.9% post-transaction. In addition, the factor grows by “8.3% above the 
industry mean over the three years following a going-private transaction” (Renneboog et 
Simons, 2005, pp.24). 
                                                             
3 “The change of control covenant enables the bondholders to sell the bonds back at par in the event of a 
change of firm control” (Baran et King, 2010, pp.1860).  
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CHAPTER III: TECHNIQUES FOR DELISTING 
 
Broadly speaking, the mechanisms available to delist a company can be divided into those 
that are carried out through open market operations, and those requiring the approval of the 
board of directors and/or of the shareholders’ meeting. Within these groups, the prevalent 
literature (De Angelo et al., 1984; Martinez et Serve, 2011) recognizes two main methods to 
accomplish this proposal: the buyout offer with squeeze-out (BOSO) is the most used 
approach in the Continental European countries, and the leveraged buyout (LBO) which is 
more developed in the U.S. and U.K. markets. The former is usually initiated by the existing 
controlling shareholders that seek to complete equity ownership through a tender offer in 
order to cash out minority shareholders. This outcome can be achieved through merger, asset 
sales, tender offer, or reverse stock split. The latter can be initiated by many different parties, 
who acquire and subsequently delist the company and it is usually financed through high 
leverage and new capital. It is usually carried out through mergers or asset sales.  
In this paragraph the most common techniques are presented. The choice to distinguish them 
according to geographical markets is due to the recognition that the mechanisms are strongly 
influenced by the stock exchange regulations and by the jurisdiction of the State in which the 
markets are located. However, it is important to keep in mind that even if less common, it is 
not excluded that some instrument covered in the section about the U.S. market can also be 
applied, with the necessary adjustments, also to the European one (and vice versa).  For 
example, leveraged buyout is illustrated in the American part because it is an important 
characteristic of this market, but it does not mean that LBOs are not allowed in the European 
markets. 
A consistent part of the jurisdiction has the aim to protect the minority shareholders’ 
interest that is usually negatively affected by delisting. The US rules are characterized by 
greater flexibility and less minority protection, and for this reason the deals are subject to a 
greater number of ex post lawsuits. On the other hand, the stricter ex ante regulations of 
European countries diminish the dissenters’ complaints. The comparison between the 
regulations to protect investors in Europe and in the U.S. allows to conclude that there are two 
main approaches to protect minorities when the delisting is performed through a corporate 
operation:  
1) Where the delisting decision must be taken or is usually taken by the board of 
directors or a similar corporate organ, shareholders are usually protected by the 
doctrine of fiduciary duties of directors. This solution has been adopted by most 
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American markets (NYSE, NASDAQ, Toronto Stock Exchange) and some European 
ones (NYSE Euronext Paris, NYSE Euronext Amsterdam).  
2) Otherwise the minorities can be protected through the requirement of shareholders 
vote for delisting (for examples, Borsa Italiana, Bolsa de Madrid, Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, Singapore Stock Exchange, Buenos Aires Stock Exchange). In this case, 
rules must also determine whether the decision is approved by ordinary resolution 
(simple majority of votes) or special resolution (qualified majority of votes in 2/3 of 
votes or 75% from the majority of votes). As the Italian case will document, in some 
countries dissent shareholders have exit (or appraisal) rights and in this case the 
problem is how to fairly price stocks distributed to these shareholders.  
These are the most common minority protection solutions; however there are many other 
intermediate approaches that stock markets can adopt. For instance, in India if the company 
has an alternative stock exchange market in which to trade after delisting, the board of 
directors has the power to decide for delisting; but if the company has not an alternative 
market, the board of directors’ decision must be approved by shareholders. In some countries, 
shareholders have even veto rights to delisting decision.  
 
3.1 WAYS TO DELIST IN EUROPE: THE ITALIAN CASE 
This paragraph analyses in detail the legislation about delisting techniques applicable in Italy 
that, with some clarifications, can be considered representative of the European legislations. 
The Italian stock market is regulated and supervised by two institutions: Borsa Italiana S.p.a, 
and the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB). The table below shows 
their most important responsibilities:  
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Voluntary delisting in Italy can be achieved through three techniques:  
1. Shareholders’ decision; 
2. Merger with a private company or newco; 
3. Tender offer (the so called “Offerta Pubblica di Aquisto” (OPA) in the Italian 
legislation). 
In the first two methods, shareholders’ meeting has to approve the operations that lead to the 
delisting of the company and the pre-transaction shareholders usually receive shares of the 
private company. In both cases, the shareholders that do not approve the deliberation have the 
right of withdrawal. On the other hand, the last method is an open market operation that does 
not require the consent of the target’s shareholders. As we will see, in this case the delisting is 
the consequence of the failure to meet the minimum level of free float
4
 required to trade in the 
regulated markets.  
It is important to know that, more often than not, the delisting occurs through steps that can 
involve more than one technique in order to increase the probability of the success of the 
process.  
3.1.1. SHAREHOLDERS’ DECISION 
Italian legislation provides the possibility for shareholders to decide to delist the company 
without any capital’s change or extraordinary operation. Indeed, art.133 of the Consolidate 
Law of Finance (T.U.F) considers the chance of the Exclusion upon request from trading: 
“Subject to approval by an extraordinary shareholders' meeting, Italian companies with shares 
                                                             
4
 The free float of a company represents the portion of the shares that can be publicly traded  
Borsa Italiana 
• defining the organization and 
functioning of the markets; 
• defining the conditions and 
procedures for admission and 
contiuned inclusion of issuers, 
and exclusion and suspension 
thereform; 
• managing the information 
communicated by the listed 
companies; 
• supervising and managing the 
market so as to allow the correct 
course of trading. 
CONSOB 
• regulating the procedures for 
carrying out offerings; 
• defining the listed company 
disclosure obligations, including 
periodic information and 
information on significant events; 
• authorizing the operation of 
regulated markets; 
• controlling of the information 
contained in the accounting 
documents of listed companies 
and the information that the 
companies provide to the 
maerket. 
Source: Borsa Italiana website, own elaboration 
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listed on regulated markets in Italy may request that their own financial instruments be 
excluded from trading, in accordance with the provisions of the rules of the market, where 
they are admitted to listing on other regulated markets in Italy or another EU country, 
provided investors are ensured equivalent protection, according to standards established by 
Consob in a regulation”. Consob regulates the process of delisting upon request through 
Art.2.5.6 of the Rules of the Markets organized and managed by Borsa Italiana Spa 
(thereafter, the Rules). According to this article, the company has to send to Borsa Italiana a 
written request and Borsa Italiana has 10 days to arrange the delisting that, in any case, cannot 
take place before three months from the submission of the request. Moreover, fifteen days 
before the date of delisting the company has to publish a notice in a national newspaper in 
order to remind the imminent delisting to the public. The aim of these deadlines is to 
guarantee to all shareholders an appropriate time to decide whether they are willing to remain 
shareholders of the private company or, alternatively, to have enough time to sell their shares. 
Regarding the required quorum for the decision, the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting of 
listed companies requires the approving vote of at least two thirds of participating 
shareholders, and the meeting is established with the participation of at least half of the 
corporation stock (Art.2368 Italian Civil Code (c.c.)).  
 
Until 2004, some scholars interpreted art.133 T.U.F as if shareholders could request to list the 
company in another Italian or European exchange market, but could not ask to completely 
delist the company from all markets. This interpretation came from the combined reading of 
art.133 and art.131 T.U.F. Article 131 T.U.F. arranged that shareholders that did not vote in 
favour of the merger with a private company could ask the right of withdrawal to protect 
themselves from the loss of benefits coming from the public status. The absence of a similar 
protection in the case of exclusion upon request suggested to some scholars that article 133 
was only about migration to different markets, and that the scenario suggested by art.131 was 
the only way to completely exclude a company from the public trading with a decision of the 
shareholders’ meeting.  
The plausibility of this strict interpretation has been removed with the introduction of 
art.2437-quinquies c.c. and the abrogation of art.131 T.U.F in 2004. The new provision of 
the Italian Civil Code allows shareholders of a listed company to withdraw whenever they 
have not taken part in the decision to delist. As Pomelli (2009) states, the new rule focuses on 
the outcome of the decision (the delisting), rather than the subject of the resolution (the 
merger or the request of exclusion). However, if the delisting from Borsa Italiana is aimed to 
the listing in another Italian market or in an European market that provides equivalent 
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guarantees, the withdrawal right is not ensure because shareholders that do not agree can sell 
their shares in the new markets and the right of withdrawal could be detrimental for the 
society.  
With the introduction of the new article in the Italian Civil Code and the abrogation of the 
article from the Italian Consolidate Law of Finance in mind, it is reasonable to extend the 
procedures gathered from art.133 T.U.F. (extraordinary shareholders’ meeting quorum, 
disclosure requirements, …) to all cases in which the shareholders decide to delist the 
company, and not only in the case of migration to different markets.  
 
Another important aspect that must be considered whenever the delisting follows a 
shareholders’ decision is how to calculate the shares’ value once a shareholder has decided 
to exercise his right of withdrawal. Art.2337-ter c.c. establishes that the settlement should be 
equal to the arithmetic mean of the closing prices in the six months before the notice of the 
convocation of the meeting that leads to the delisting decision. This is the only mechanism 
permitted and it has two main advantages. The first one is linked to the objectivity of the 
results that prevents any possible ex post notification of shareholders that could be detrimental 
for the company, for the other shareholders, and for creditors. The second one is that, 
assuming that markets are efficient, the market price should be the best approximation of the 
value of the company. Nowadays most scholars support the hypothesis that markets are 
semistrong-form efficient, meaning that prices incorporate all publicly available information: 
not only accounting information, but also the forecast of the firm’s performance, and industry 
and economic trends. Moreover, since the market price is the result of the value assessment of 
several investors with different knowledge, they usually “estimate fundamental values more 
accurately than any individual trader can” (Harris, 2008, pp.224). However, Pomelli (2009) 
explains the reason why the market price of the date of the announcement of the meeting may 
not be the fair price for outgoing shareholders and thus why the legislators introduce the 
average over six months. The problem is that if the markets do not appreciate the prospect of 
the delisting when they receive the notice of the convocation of the meeting that will decide 
on the topic, the prices fall and thus the right of withdrawal at the market price does not 
provide any advantages compared with the immediate sale of the shares through open market 
operations. The reason for the rather long time span of six months is that usually information 
about the possibility of the delisting arrives in markets well before the date of the notice of the 
convocation of the meeting. In order to make the right of withdrawal meaningful, the 
arithmetic mean is intended to remove the impact that the news about delisting could have had 
on prices.  
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3.1.2. MERGER BY ACQUISITION WITH A PRIVATE COMPANY OR A NEWCO 
The second mechanism to delist a company is the merger of the public company with a 
private one or the establishment of a new company (newco) with the unique aim of absorbing 
the public firm. The process provided for this technique is similar to the process described in 
the previous case: the decision requires the approval of the extraordinary shareholders' 
meeting, the shareholders of the public company receive shares of the new private company, 
and those that do not participate to the decision have the right of withdrawal (as already 
described, this right has been guaranteed until 2004 by art.131 T.U.F., and nowadays by the 
application of art. 2437-quinquies c.c.).  
It is important to notice that, differently from the U.S. case, in Italy and in most European 
countries, cash-out mergers are not permitted (the merger with the possibility of freeze-out 
the minority shareholders will be analysed in detail in the paragraph about the ways of 
delisting in the U.S. markets). Art.3 of the Directive 78/855/CEE states that: “Merger by 
acquisition shall mean the operation whereby one or more companies are wound up without 
going into liquidation and transfer to another all their assets and liabilities in exchange for the 
issue to the shareholders of the company or companies being acquired of shares in the 
acquiring company and a cash payment, if any, not exceeding 10% of the nominal value of 
the shares so issued or, where they have no nominal value, of their accounting par value”. 
From this definition it is possible to gather that a European listed company cannot set an 
exchange ratio so high that the majority of small investors do not receive any shares of the 
private corporation. The limit of 10% on the cash payment allows to buy the shares only of a 
small fraction of the outstanding shares.  
The significant difference between European and American legislations comes from the 
already mentioned different approaches on minority protection. The European regulation is 
particularly restrictive on freeze-out because of the belief that shareholder always has an 
“untouchable property rights in his shares” (Ventoruzzo, 2010, pp. 5) and therefore tries to 
protect them ex ante. In order to protect minorities, most jurisdictions determine that the 
exchange rate must be set by a “court-appointed expert before the shareholders’ meeting 
called to vote on the merger” (Ventoruzzo, 2010, pp.39).  
 
To conclude this dissertation about the two methods that involve corporate operations, we 
argue that delisting carried out through Exclusion upon request is easier, faster, and less 
expensive. However, as documented earlier, the uncertainty about the validity of this kind 
of procedure when it does not cause the migration to another regulated market encourages 
many corporations to delist through the Merger by acquisition mechanism.  
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3.1.3. TENDER OFFER 
The European prohibition of cash-out mergers depicts one of the main disadvantages of the 
first two mechanisms used to go private: minority shareholders can decide to hold their 
ownership position, participate in the operation management, and share the corporate’s 
results, which might be unfavourable from the point of view of the controlling shareholder. 
For example, these techniques do not fit if the reason that pushes controlling shareholder to go 
private is to acquire the ownership of the outstanding shares or to reacquire the shares that he 
has sold during the IPO. Both in the case of the shareholders’ meeting decision and in the case 
of the merger with a private company, if the minority shareholders do not exercise the 
withdrawal or if they do not sell their shares before delisting, they have the right to maintain 
their ownership stake, with an almost unchanged stock dilution. Moreover, due to the strict 
protection rules on these delisting mechanisms, every indirect attempt to exclude minorities 
has a high risk of litigations on its legitimacy.  
Data shows that minority shareholders usually do not want to hold the stake once the 
company delist because of the illiquidity of the shares. However, given the high ownership 
concentration of Italian (and European) firms and the consequent common desire to delist in 
order to achieve the complete control of the company, the most used technique in the 
Continental Europe is the tender offer (also called takeover bid). For example, over the 
period 1997-2006 in France 300 firms out of 350 went private through tender offer (Martinez 
et Serve, 2011). Given the widespread use of tender offers among European markets, the 
jurisdictions of the different countries have been harmonized with Directive 2004/25/EC 
(Takeover Directive). As we will see, through tender offer there are circumstances under 
which controlling shareholders can squeeze-out minorities (the so called Buyout offer with 
squeeze-out (BOSO)). Even if BOSO is very common, it is important to notice that the tender 
offer can, in theory, lead to delisting even without the necessity to freeze-out the minorities. 
 
The key characteristic of this mechanism is that it does not require the approval of the 
shareholders or of the board of directors because it is an open market operation, and each 
individual shareholder can decide if he is willing or not to sell his shares. In the case of the 
tender offer, the reason that leads to the delisting is the reduction of the free float under the 
minimum level required by law (in Italy the threshold is 25% of the total shares). Through the 
tender offer, a shareholder that already hold a majority stake in the company makes a public 
offer to buy all the outstanding shares at a price higher than the current market price
5
.  
                                                             
5 Article 15 of the Takeover Directive states that an investor that acquires the control of a listed corporation has 
the duty to launch a tender offer on all outstanding voting shares (Mandatory Bid).  
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The shareholder that promotes the tender offer decides its duration that, in any case, cannot be 
shorter than 15 days or longer than 25 days
6
 (Art.40, Regolamento Emittenti CONSOB).  
Borsa Italiana identifies four main types of tender offer: 
 Opa volontaria. Public takeover bid voluntarily proposed by an individual that wants 
to acquire the company’s shares. 
 Opa obbligatoria. The shareholder that acquires more than 30% of the corporate’s 
capital is obliged to launch the tender offer on all outstanding shares. The purpose of 
the legislator is to guarantee to minority shareholders that do not appreciate the new 
control the possibility to sell their position.  
 Opa preventiva. It allows to obtain the control of the company without the duty to 
launch a tender offer on all outstanding shares. The conditions to pursue this solution 
is that the investor does not hold 30% of voting rights and he has not purchased stakes 
higher than 1% in the twelve months before the communication to the CONSOB about 
the intention to launch the tender offer. Moreover, the procedure must be approved by 
the other shareholders that own the majority. If these conditions are satisfied, the 
shareholder can try to acquire up to 60% of the shares though a takeover bid, without 
the need of the mandatory offer for the other 40%.  
However, the controlling shareholder can be still obliged to pursue a mandatory 
takeover bid if in the twelve months after the closing of the opa preventiva he acquires 
additional shares for an amount higher than 1%, or if the target company approves a 
merger or a spin-off.  
 Opa residuale. If an investor acquires more than 90% of the voting rights he is forced 
to launch a tender offer on all outstanding shares. In effect, in this case the minority 
shareholders run a risk to hold illiquid shares if the required free float is not restored. 
This type of takeover bid is analysed in more detail below.  
Therefore, based on the level of minority shareholders’ subscription, the promoter of the 
takeover bid can be able to purchase an ownership’s percentage high enough to force also the 
shareholders that do not accept the tender offer to sell their shares in exchange for an 
indemnity. This situation is called freeze-out (or squeeze-out)
7
, and can be performed either 
because of a statutory provision, or because the controlling shareholder has been able to create 
de facto strong incentives for minority shareholders.  
                                                             
6 The CONSOB has the authority to extend the duration of the tender offer if required by the market’s 
circumstances until a maximum of 55 days (Art. 40, Regolamento Emittenti Consob) 
7
 Following the view of the majority (Pomelli, 2009; Investopedia.com), in this paper the two terms are used 
interchangeably. However some scholars (Ventoruzzo, 2010) argue that “squeeze-out” should be more 
appropriately used if the minority shareholders remain members of the organization even if they are hit by the 
value expropriation of the managers and/or controlling shareholders that launch the tender offer.  
42 
 
It is possible to identify three different cases:  
 
The controlling shareholder acquires a stake of voting rights higher than 95%: 
implementation of Art. 111, paragraph 1, T.U.F.  
“Any person who, as a result of a public offer to buy all shares with voting rights, owns more 
than ninety-five per cent of such shares shall be entitled to acquire the remaining shares 
within three months of the close of the offer, provided he declared his intention to exercise 
this right in the offer document”. This provision of the Testo unico delle disposizioni in 
materia di intermediazione finanziaria mirrors art.15 of the Takeover Directive, according 
to which freeze-out right must be recognized to the shareholder that following a voluntary or 
mandatory tender offer holds “not less than 90% of the capital carrying voting rights and 90% 
of the voting rights”. Italy sets a threshold of 95% because paragraph 2 of the aforementioned 
article considers the possibility for a Member State to “set a higher threshold that may not, 
however, be higher than 95% of the capital carrying voting rights and 95% of the voting 
rights”. This is known as “Single Threshold” Freeze-out. Art.15 of the Takeover Directive 
also provides for an alternative scenario, the so called “Majority of the Minority” freeze-
out which entails a “(super)majority of the minority approval” (Ventoruzzo, 2010, pp.40). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The controlling shareholder acquires a stake of voting rights higher than 90% but lower 
than 95%: implementation of Art. 108, paragraph 2, T.U.F.  
In this case, the promoter of the tender offer has to buy all outstanding shares from investors 
that ask for this; alternatively, he has to restore a free floating sufficient to ensure regular 
trading.  
Figure 3.4. Implementation of freeze-out rights in some European countries 
Source: Ventoruzzo (2010), pp.48 
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If, even after the application of article 108 T.U.F., the controlling shareholder does not 
possess a percentage of voting rights that allows to squeeze-out the minorities ex Art.111 
T.U.F., the company is delisted and the remaining shareholders will receive shares of the 
private company. It is evident that in this case the problem of the exclusion of minorities is 
still on hand. However, differently from the two delisting mechanisms that require the 
shareholders’ meeting decision, in this case the shareholders that do not sell their shares 
during the takeover bid do not have the right of withdrawal. Consequently, according to 
Pomelli (2009) the minority shareholders are subsidized to sell their shares through the 
provision of art.108 T.U.F. rather than to risk to be tricked in an illiquid investment. If the 
hypothesis of Pomelli (2009) is true, the promoter has high probability to reach the 95% 
threshold.  
 
The controlling shareholder gains less than 90% of voting rights with the tender offer.  
In this case it is difficult to close a voluntary delisting. However, the takeover bid could 
trigger one of the motivations that lead to the involuntary delisting dictated by Borsa Italiana 
ex art. 2.5.1 of the Rules (for a better understanding of involuntary delisting, see paragraph 
3.3). In particular, if some minority shareholders have a stake higher than 2%, it is likely that 
the free float will not meet the required level to remain in the market.  
 
In theory, delisting through BOSO should be more advantageous for minority shareholders 
rather than the shareholders’ meeting decision or the merger by acquisition. Indeed, the tender 
offer lets share’s owners free to decide whether they want to sell their position or not. Instead, 
through the other mechanisms a shareholder that has the majority of the voting rights can 
provoke the delisting without the acceptance of the other shareholders. However, as already 
touched on, also in the BOSO case the minority shareholders can be disadvantaged by the 
cash-out and legislators should protect them.  
A still problematic issue regarding minorities’ protection is about the determination of the 
offer price of the tender offer. The Takeover Directive only requires that the price must be 
fair. If the tender offer has been launched as a consequence of the acquisition of control 
(mandatory tender offer), art.5 of the Takeover Directive states that the equitable price shall 
be “the highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror […] over a period, to be 
determined by Member States, of not less than six months and not more than 12 before the 
bid. If, after the bid has been made public and before the offer closes for acceptance, the 
offeror purchases securities at a price higher than the offer price, the offeror shall increase his 
offer so that it is not less than the highest price paid for the securities so acquired”. On the 
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other hand, in the case of a voluntary takeover bid, the directive does not provide any 
minimum price. Given the compliance with the criteria set by Art.5 of the Takeover Directive, 
different strategies can be applied. It is important to notice that, even if the controlling 
shareholder has not been able to acquire the required ownership stake to freeze-out minorities 
through the tender offer, it is likely that he has reached a share of voting rights that assures 
him the majority in shareholders’ meeting so that he may try to reach his goal through one of 
the other two techniques. Therefore, one profitable solution from the point of view of the 
shareholder that launches the tender offer could be to put in a bid a price slightly higher than 
the amount that minority shareholders would receive exercising the withdrawal right if the 
delisting is pursued though a corporate operation. Since Art.2337-ter c.c. clearly defines how 
to calculate the possible settlement, the promoter can carefully time the takeover bid in order 
to minimize the premium he has to pay. Another possibility could be to offer a price at a 
premium over the current market price, but lower than what the minority shareholders would 
receive in case of withdraw. In this case, the minority investors have to consider the 
likelihood of the success of the tender offer, which is often difficult to establish. Considering 
these possible strategies, it is evident that the delisting through takeover bid not only increases 
the probability of eliminating minority shareholders, but also allows to achieve this result 
paying lower costs than the merger by acquisition. Croci and Del Giudice (2014) argue that 
the higher the ownership percentage of controlling shareholder, the lower the premium that is 
paid to minorities. In addition, European legislation does not recognize the right of 
withdrawal in the context of tender offer, and thus the shareholders that do not take part to the 
auction are subjected to higher risk. At the end, the occurrence of this risk limits ex ante the 
freedom of the minority shareholders.  
 
3.2 WAYS TO DELIST IN THE U.S. 
 
An important distinction in the U.S. context is the difference between “going private” and 
“going dark”. Going private transactions includes all those dealings where minorities are 
cash-out. On the other hand, through going dark transactions, companies decide to reduce the 
number of shareholders so that they can remove themselves from the stock exchange, but not 
all shareholders are cash-out. Going-dark firms after the date of deregistration usually 
continue to trade in non-regulated markets such as the Pink-Sheet. In other words, going dark 
transactions allow to benefit from the delisting and deregistration advantages, without going 
completely private.    
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3.2.1 GOING PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS 
As we will soon see, a going private transaction can be performed through different types of 
transactions. All these procedures, even if usually initiated by controlling shareholders or 
external acquirer, require a shareholder vote, disclosure, and board considerations. In order to 
be eligible to delist and deregister, companies must fill documents described in the SEC 
Schedule 13e-3 (“going private” rule), and this usually involves the cash-out of all of the 
company’s public shares.  
First of all, we analyse freeze-out transactions and in particular the delisting through tender 
offer and through statutory merger freeze-out, focusing on the differences with the European 
regulation. Then, in the second part of this dissertation about going private transactions, we 
will analyse the most used technique used by American corporations to go private, which is 
the leveraged buyout (LBO).  
 
FREEZE-OUT TRANSACTIONS. As already explained for the European case, in order to 
freeze-out minorities controlling shareholders have to own at least 90% of voting rights. 
There are different ways through which controlling shareholders can achieve the required 
amount of shares to squeeze-out other shareholders:  
 
1. TENDER OFFER 
The easiest approach to complete the going private transaction is to launch a tender 
offer on all outstanding shares, which can be or can be not previously approved by the 
board of directors of the target. If, after the tender offer, the bidder is able to own at 
least 90% of the outstanding shares, the deal can be completed with a short-form 
merger without the need for the approval neither of the company’s remaining 
shareholders nor of the target’ board of directors. According to the U.S. Federal 
Securities rules, the tender offer cannot last less than 20 business days.  
A recent trend in negotiated tender offer is to grant the acquirer a “top-up option”. 
After the tender offer’s closure, an acquirer that has bargained a top-up option can 
acquire additional shares from the company in order to reach the 90% threshold. 
Usually, the additional shares are purchased at the price of the shares of the takeover 
bid. A common “top-up option” agreement provides that for every 1% that a bidder’s 
tender offer falls short of 90%, the target has to issue that number of stocks which is 
equal to 10% of its outstanding share prior to the tender offer. There are two main 
conditions to use the top-up option. The first one is that the company must have in 
place sufficient reserves of authorized but not issued stock in order to cover the option. 
46 
 
Secondly, the shareholder approval is necessary when the target has to issue shares for 
an amount equal or higher than 20% of the outstanding shares.  
The reason of the current increase on this instrument is that it may be beneficial both 
for the bidder and for the target company. Indeed, the option usually provides that it 
can be exercised only if the acquirer has reached a certain amount of the target’s 
capital stock through the tender offer so that, even if the bidder has not the right to 
perform a short-form merger, the approval of the shareholders’ meeting required for 
the long-form merger is just a fait accompli. In such a case, it could be convenient also 
for the remaining shareholders of the target to avoid the costly process of the merger 
freeze-out.  
2. LONG-FORM, STATUTORY MERGER FREEZE-OUT  
Through the statutory merger freeze-out, controlling shareholders decide for a merger 
with a private company and the minority shareholders will not receive any shares of 
the new entity, but rather will receive cash or other non-equity securities. The 
acceptance for this mechanism, not permitted under the Italian (and European) 
jurisdiction, is rooted in the belief of American legislators that nowadays the 
minority’s dictatorship can be more expensive and dangerous than the risk that 
controlling shareholders can abuse of their power. 
In order to analyse cash-out merger, Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) is 
considered the most complete jurisdiction at which many other States look at because 
of the extensive number of case law that it covers. Section 251 and 259 of DGCL 
provide that statutory merger must be approved by the board of directors as well as by 
more than half of the votes at the shareholders’ meeting. However, a simplification of 
the procedure is contemplated if “each share of stock of such constituent corporation 
outstanding immediately prior to the effective date of the merger is to be an identical 
outstanding or treasury share of the surviving corporation after the effective date of the 
merger” and if “securities of obligations to be issued or delivered under such plan do 
not exceed 20% of the shares of common stock of such constituent corporation 
outstanding immediately prior to the effective date of the merger” (§ 251(f), DGCL). 
In this case the vote of the shareholders of the constituent corporation is not required.  
Minority shareholders who are not willing to exchange their shares for the cash 
offered are protected though the appraisal rights, according to which they can ask the 
liquidation of their shares at a fair price determined by the Court of Chancery. This 
provision is usually used when the minorities judge the offered cash less than what the 
company is worth. The fair value of the shares must be determined taking into account 
47 
 
“any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger 
or consolidation […]. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account 
all relevant factors” (§ 262(h), DGCL). However, in practice, the minority 
shareholders find difficulties in enforcing appraisal rights because the procedure is 
rather complex and expensive: shareholders that are looking for appraisal must “notify 
the corporation of their intent before the shareholders’ meeting that trigger the right” 
(Ventoruzzo, 2010, pp.14) and then they have to dissent at the meeting. Moreover, the 
fair value of the shares is usually computed without considering the potential 
synergies of the merger and minorities do not have enough information to determine 
the probability that the post-acquisition gains will be higher than the fair value of the 
appraisal rights. An alternative solution for dissenting shareholders to appraisal rights 
is to complain for some form of illegality, such as the lack of authority or abuse of 
power.  
 
LEVERAGED BUYOUT  
Paragraph 3.1 documents that European companies usually delist through BOSO. In the U.S. 
the most common technique for PtP transactions is the leveraged buyout (LBO). LBO can be 
defined as “an acquisition of a corporation as a whole or a division of a corporation mostly 
with cash, the cash being raised with a preponderance of debt raised by the acquirer”8 
(Sudarsanam, 2003, pp.268). In the case of delisting through LBO, the public company is first 
of all acquired and subsequently delisted. The reason of the predominance of LBO over other 
kinds of mechanism can be attributed to the fact that this organizational form allows to 
overcome some of the shortcomings of being listed that have been presented in Chapter II: 
 Discipline of debt: the high leverage forces management to carefully evaluate the 
investments so that they are able to generate the cash necessary to repay interests and 
the principal. In addition, the free cash flow must be used to pay off debt rather than 
being used to empire-building.  
 Efficient corporate governance: LBO removes the conflicts between ownership and 
control, which are the source of the agency conflict. Usually the acquirers that have 
invested in the target own the majority of seats on the board. Also in the case of an 
institutional buyout, the alignment is guaranteed by the incentives given to managers 
in the forms of stock options or ratchet payments.  
                                                             
8 It is important to remember that LBO does not necessarily imply delisting since LBO can also refer to private 
firms that are bought through an increase in leverage. In the paper, the term LBO refers to the cases where the 
target firm is a company listed on a stock exchange.  
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Michael Jensen (1976) hypnotizes that the raise of leveraged buyout would be a new 
organizational form that will substitute the inefficient public corporation.  
 
LBO can be initiated by different parties. When the firm is taken over by incumbent 
management the LBO is called management buyout (MBO); when the corporation is 
acquired and then delisted by an outside management team, it is known as management 
buyin (MBI). MBIs are usually hostile transactions since they occur when the current 
managers do not want or are not able to realize the full potential of the firm. It can also 
happen that the acquired firm is managed by some old target management and by some new 
management (the so called buyin management buyout, BIMBO). These types of processes 
are usually supported by private equity firms. Finally, when the only promoter of the going-
private transaction is an institutional investor or a private equity firm, the deal is called 
institutional buyouts (IBOs). In this hypothesis, the pre-transaction management can be 
replaced by a new team or can be confirmed. In all these cases, it is common that managerial 
performance is reward with equity stakes in the new private company (equity ratchets).  
Different reasons can explain why PtP through LBO predominates in the US (and in the UK), 
but not in Continental Europe. A first explanation is that European listed companies are 
highly concentrated and family sponsored; in this case the probability of being acquired by 
unrelated bidders or private equity firms decreases. Another limit faced by European 
corporations is the lower availability of sources of debt. In the US, for instance, the LBO’s 
trend has been boost by “junk bonds”, which are not equally developed in Europe. Finally, 
private equity firms, key players in the implementation of LBOs, are not widespread in the 
old continent.  
3.2.2 GOING DARK TRANSACTIONS 
Going dark transactions do not contemplate neither the necessity of shareholders’ approval in 
order to go private, nor the need of any shareholder cash out. The corporation, without 
becoming completely private, delist and deregister its shares. In other words, the 
important advantage of going dark transactions is that they allow to maintain a certain number 
of “public” shareholders, although being relieved both of the stock exchange regulations and 
of the SEC reporting requirements (the U.S. Exchange Act of 1934 and Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
impositions). The board of directors of U.S.-listed companies has the right to voluntarily 
delist the securities if the firm records fewer than 300 shareholders, or fewer than 500 holders 
and less than $10 Million of assets in the previous three years. In this case, NASDAQ 
requires that the board of directors has simply to demonstrate that the PtP transaction is in the 
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best interest of the company and its shareholders; NYSE requires the approval of the audit 
committee of the board of directors. Companies usually decide to undertake this solution 
when they do not have enough cash in order to perform a tender offer or a repurchase 
program. 
 
The assumption that going dark transactions do not involve shareholders cash out does not 
mean that freeze-out is not performed as a required step in order to meet the criteria to go 
dark. If this is the case, firms can try to reduce its shareholders of record though two 
strategies. The first one is the reverse stock split with a sizable split ratio. This means that a 
certain number of outstanding shares are exchanged for one share of a greater value; minority 
shareholders that do not own enough shares to receive at least one share can receive a cash 
equivalent of their fraction of shares. This approach requires the shareholders’ approval and 
often triggers litigations for the determination of the exchange ratio. The second possibility is 
a tender offer, whereby the company tries to repurchase its shares. Even though this 
approach is usually faster and gives raise to less litigation, the company cannot be sure to 
decrease the number of record holders below 300.  
 
One of the biggest issues of going dark transactions is about the aforementioned criteria of the 
number of shareholder of record in order to be eligible to these types of deals. Indeed, first of 
all the thresholds required to have access to the procedure can be misleading: a shareholder of 
record often includes hundreds of beneficial shareholders, for example if the financial 
institution holds shares in street name. Secondly, whenever the company no longer satisfies 
the limit on the number of record holders, it is immediately subject again to reporting 
obligations. For instance, this problem can arise if the institution that holds shares in street 
name transfers the property back to the beneficial owner for whom it holds the shares; in this 
case, the beneficial owner is a new record shareholders and the threshold can be surpassed.  
 
A delisted corporation can still trade in non-regulated markets such as the OTB Bulletin 
Board, but a deregistered one cannot. The only solution for a deregistered company that 
want to be publicly traded is to “be listed” in the Pink Sheets market.  
It is important to keep in mind the difference between delisting and deregistering. U.S. listed 
companies must be in line both with the listing requirements of the Stock Exchange in which 
they are traded and with the requirements of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 governed by 
the Security Exchange Commission (the SEC). The delisting process eliminates the obligation 
to meet the exchange requirements, but in order to eliminate also the reporting obligations to 
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the SEC firms have to deregister. Usually companies start the delisting and the deregistration 
process simultaneously; however, since the latter is a more complicated and time consuming 
process, it can happen that a delisted company continues to be exposed to strict reporting 
rules. Empirical researches reports that “the bulk of compliance costs involve SEC 
registration” (Chaplinsky et Ramchand, 2008, pp.25) and, as mentioned in Chapter II, the 
increasing costs derived from the introduction of SOX have been seen as a strong incentive 
for delisting. The delisting and deregistering processes are not easy and, even more important, 
they are time consuming. Moreover, the introduction of the SOX in 2003 has further added 
difficulties in the deregistration process. The delisting and deregistering procedures start 
filling Form 25. The corporation has to inform the public (through a press release) about its 
intention to file Form 25 with 10 days in advance. The delisting is effective 10 days after the 
submission of the document; since that date, the firms’ duties under Section 13(a) of the U.S. 
Exchange Act are suspended. The actual termination of registration (under Section 12(b)) 
occurs only after 90 days since the delisting. However, also after having file Section 25, the 
firm is still subjected to obligations of Section 12(g)
9
, which are eliminated only filling Form 
15. Form 15 proves that that the limits on the number of shareholders of record are respected.  
The Pink Sheets is an electronic quotation system that lists bid and ask prices for unlisted 
stocks, began in 1904, operated by a private company that does not require any Exchange Act 
or SEC reporting. As an alternative to the Pink Sheets, delisted companies can trade on the 
Nasdaq OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB). However, on January 1999 the SEC approved the 
eligibility rule, according to which in order to trade in this market the company has to meet 
the reporting requirements under the Security Exchange Act of 1934. Delisted corporations 
issue a request to the SEC and simultaneously ask broker-dealer firms to be registered to 
quote their securities on the OTCBB. With the introduction of the eligibility rule, the firms 
that were not in line with the SEC have either to update their disclosures, or to move to the 
Pink Sheets.  
 
To conclude the dissertation about the U.S. delisting techniques, we recall the minorities’ 
protection rules available in addition to the described appraisal right. We have already 
mentioned that in the U.S. there is a litigation-based system where the board of directors has a 
high decision-making freedom, but the deals are usually associated with a higher number of 
ex-post lawsuits compared to European context. In practice, in the U.S. minority investors can 
                                                             
9 All companies with more than 300 shareholders and assets above 10 million $ have to register in Section 
12(g). In the same section, must be registered companies that have less than 10 million $, but more than 500 
shareholders.  
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protect their stake in two ways: the first one is in the hand of the SEC that can impose 
additional conditions on the issuers in order to increase investors’ protection. In other words, 
the SEC may postpone the delisting procedure in order to verify the regularity of the 
application of Form 25, under section 12 (b) of the Act. However, in practice the SEC seldom 
intervenes to delay the delisting, providing that an appropriate protection is given to minority 
shareholders whenever they have had sufficient time to sell their shares in the regulated 
markets. The second mechanism involves litigation against the board of directors who 
approved the delisting if there is the suspect of a breach of their fiduciary duties. The directors 
have to act in good faith and to take decisions that are in the best interest of the company and 
of its shareholders. The prohibition of “self-dealing” wants to ensure the director’s 
independence with respect to a particular proposal. However, also the effectiveness of this 
protection is doubtful. Indeed, American courts judge a director liable only if his/her decisions 
are completely irrational. However, despite the appearances, Bates et al. (2006) report that in 
the U.S. target shareholders gain a premium of about 14,9% from freeze-out bids even when 
the bidder is the controlling shareholders. 
 
3.3 INVOLUNTARY DELISTING 
 
The definition of “delisting companies” embraces different types of transactions. The first 
broader distinction is between voluntary and involuntary transactions. As stated in the 
introduction, the present paper is focused on the voluntary phenomenon. The intent of this 
paragraph is to briefly describe the elements that trigger the involuntary delisting both in the 
U.S. and in Italy.  
Most studies on involuntary delisting are focused on the US markets; maybe because it is 
more common than voluntary delisting, contrary to what happen in Europe. According to 
Djama et al., (2012) the primary reasons for this type of going private transactions are “the 
violation of stock exchange requirements” or “poor firm performance” (pp.9).  
There are a wide range of reasons that allow an exchange to delist a company and they can be 
distinguish between those that are designed to guarantee that the relationship remains 
profitable for the exchange, and those that have the aim to protect investors and the trading 
venue’s reputation. Involuntary delisting strongly depends on the peculiar rules of every 
exchange market. The NYSE, for instance, requires that the listed companies consider 
delisting if one of these 3 numeric standards are no longer meet: 
1. Number of total stockholders < 400 
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Number of publicly held shares < 600˙000 
Average monthly trading volume for the previous 12 months < 100˙000 shares 
2. Markets capitalization requirements 
3. Average closing price of a security < $1.00 for consecutive 30 trading’s day 
Moreover, a company can be delisted from the NYSE if their operating assets dramatically 
decrease or if it files for bankruptcy. The NASDAQ’s delisting requirements are very similar 
to the ones on the NYSE.  
In addition to these objective requirements, both the NYSE and the NASDAQ contemplate 
the possibility to delist a company on the base of subjective criteria, such as failure in 
accounting practices or prolonged conflicts of interests with the creditors: “Nasdaq may deny 
initial inclusion or apply additional or more stringent criteria for the initial or continued 
inclusion of particular securities or suspend or terminate the inclusion of particular securities 
based on any event, condition, or circumstance which exists or occurs that makes initial or 
continued inclusion of the securities in Nasdaq inadvisable or unwarranted in the opinion of 
Nasdaq, even though the securities meet all enumerated criteria for initial or continued 
inclusion in Nasdaq” (NASDQ, sec. 4300). The subjectivity of the involuntary delisting 
process is also attested by the high variability in the period between the time when the 
violation occurs and the effective delisting date. This disparity is partially due to the “cure 
period” that can be given to the company by the Stock Exchange in order to remediate the 
deficiency (Macery et al., 2008). Using a sample of 150 AMEX delisted firms, Chen and 
Schoderbek (1999) suggest that only 21,7% of the firms were delisted in the year of the first 
violation. Two reasons could be at the base of this delate: first, regulators could be reluctant to 
delist big companies fearing a negative impact and a loss of reputation of the market; 
secondly, the process required to detect violations can be costly and it is difficult to obtain 
exact information (Djama et al., 2012).  
 
Looking at the involuntary delisting in the European context, we consider the regulations of 
Borsa Italiana. Borsa Italiana may suspend the listing of a financial instrument, or 
permanently revoke the listing. Differently from the American’s rules, in Italy there are no 
numerical standards to decide about revocation, but there are some elements that must be 
considered (art.2.5.1, paragraph 5; Rules of the Markets organized and managed by Borsa 
Italiana):  
a) The average daily turnover in the market and the average number of securities traded 
over a period of at least eighteen months; 
b) The frequency of trading in the same period; 
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c) The distribution among the public of the financial instruments in terms of value and 
number of holders; 
d) The involvement of the issuer in insolvency proceedings;  
e) An adverse opinion by the statutory auditor or a disclaimer rendered by the statutory 
auditor for two consecutive financial years; 
f) The liquidation of the issuer; 
g) Suspension from listing for a period of more than eighteen months.  
When Borsa Italiana judges that there are the conditions for the revocation, it sends the issuer 
a written notification to explain what the reasons of the choice are, and establishes a time limit 
of no less than 15 days for the submission of briefs.  
Also the suspension is a quite common phenomenon in Italy, performed especially when the 
markets are very volatile in order to avoid excessive risks for investors. For instance, in 2003, 
there had been 49 suspensions of 39 companies, meaning that some firms had been suspended 
more than once in the same year (Geranio, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
CHAPTER IV: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 THE ITALIAN PHENOMENON 
 
As realized reviewing the main existing literature, few studies analyse the Italian phenomenon 
of the delisting companies. Therefore, first of all we describe the Italian context throughout 
own elaboration of data coming from a sample of firms delisted from Borsa Italiana. The 
main purpose of this section is to understand if and to what extent it is similar to the features 
of the delisting phenomenon in other countries described in Chapter I.  
 
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
In this section the sample selection procedure and the lists of data sources for the first part of 
empirical analysis are presented. In order to present the Italian phenomenon, we start from the 
list of all companies delisted from the Italian stock exchange (Borsa Italiana) between January 
1995 and the 30
th
 April 2015. The time span has been determined by the data available in 
Borsa Italiana website. The overall number of delisted firms is of 337. From these 
companies, we count out involuntary delisting since, as already mentioned, the focus of this 
paper is on voluntary delisting. This has been possible because the aforementioned list also 
provides the reasons that lead to the delisting. We consider involuntary delisting the 
organizations that go private because of:  
1) They do not meet the stock exchange requisites;  
2) They go bankrupt;  
3) They are subjected to liquidation; 
4) They are under the so called amministrazione straordinaria procedure;  
5) There is lack of specialists or nominated adviser (Nomad) for the particular stock.  
They turn out to be 73. This screen leaves us with a sample of 264 companies.  
 
We collect most of the information needed for the first part of the empirical analysis from the 
website of Borsa Italiana and in particular from the Analysis and Statistics section which 
includes historical data. In addition to the delisting list, particularly suitable for the purpose of 
our study have been the list of the Italian IPO occurred in the period 1995-2015, and several 
other data on the overall condition of the market. Another important data source, in particular 
for the second part of the analysis, has been the database AIDA (Analisi Formatizzata delle 
Aziende); a service provided by Bureau van Dijk S.p.a which pools information on more than 
1.000.000 private and publicly Italian listed companies. This instrument will be presented 
more in detail in paragraph 4.2; in this section the database has been useful to classify the 
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companies by industries. We finally use Il Sole 24 Ore journal to verify pertinent deal 
information, in particular when the consultation of Borsa Italiana and/or AIDA leads to doubt 
interpretations.  
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Since we have decided to focus our attention on the voluntary delisting because empirical 
literature affirms that it is the predominant type of delisting in the Continental Europe (pp.10), 
Chart 4.1 is aimed at illustrating which share of the phenomenon we are considering. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The delistings originated by a decision outside the willingness of the company’s stakeholders 
counted for about 21% of the overall deals in the period 1995-2015. For a better 
understanding of the chart, we have incorporated the reasons “lack of specialists/Nomad10” (6 
cases) and “prolonged lack of trading” (2 cases) in the category of “inadequate requisites” 
because they all refer to one of the criteria set by art.2.5.1, paragraph 5 of the Rules of the 
Markets organized and managed by Borsa Italiana S.p.A. for the revocation of the 
corporation (pp.54 of this dissertation). Instead, companies subjected to “Amministrazione 
Straordinaria” have been considered separately from “bankruptcy/liquidation” because 
according to the Italian legislation the rational of this procedure is preservative, whereas in the 
case of bankruptcy the company is liquidated. Therefore, since Harris et al. (2008) document 
                                                             
10
 A Nomad is a market player who has the duty to check the appropriateness of the firm to be admitted to the 
market, helps the company to maintain the required level of transparency, and provides advice so that the 
listed organization can meet Borsa Italiana’s rules. A Nomad can be a bank, an intermediary or a company that 
operates in the corporate finance sector. (Source: Borsa Italiana official website) 
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that the magnitude of the consequences of the involuntary delisting is strictly related to the 
reasons that provoke the delisting (refer to pp.30 of this thesis), we believe that for further 
analysis it is valuable to keep the two cases separate.   
Looking at the main delisting techniques, we confirm that Italian companies mainly go 
private through tender offers, as most European firms do (Martinez et Serve, 2011 and 
documented in Chapter III). Most of the tender offers performed in Borsa Italiana are OPA 
residuali (two-third), meaning that they have been launched once the controlling shareholder 
already owns 90% of the voting shares; 23% of takeover bids are voluntary; and the 
remaining part is due to the achievement of 30% of shares in the hand of an unique 
shareholder (OPA obbligatoria). Also the delistings through mergers and acquisitions 
appear to have an important role in the Italian context (32% of all PtP transactions). Given the 
legal prohibition to cash-out minority shareholders using this mechanism and therefore the 
actual risk that minorities can continue to own a stake in the company (pp.40 of this paper), 
we suggest that future studies should investigate whether the control hypothesis is actually 
one of the most important factors that pushes Italian companies to delist, as the literature 
review suggested (Tutino et al., 2013).  
 
Reviewing the previous researches on the international going private transactions, we notice 
that not one analysis looks at the extent of the phenomenon distinguishing companies by 
industry sectors. At first glance this scarcity could suggest the conclusion that the industry is 
irrelevant to describe the delisting events. However, our sample demonstrates that delisting 
does not occur proportionately in all industries. In order to classify the companies we progress 
through the following steps. Aida uses the Adeco 2007 categorization that is the most adopted 
Italian classification system used, among others, for official statistics by Istat and for fiscal 
issues by the Agenzia delle Entrate. This classification is organized in six levels, labelled by a 
number (each digit corresponds to a level) and a brief description. The problem faced was that 
Aida provides the subcategories, which are the maximum level of detail with 1226 possible 
different titles: too much variety for a sample of 264 companies. For this reason, the second 
step has been the allocation of each subcategory to the respective activity looking at the 
Adeco website (Adeco 2007 recognized 18 activities).
11
 Chart 4.2 documents that delisting is 
                                                             
11 For a better understanding of the Adeco 2007 classification see:  
  www.infocamere.it/movimprese/-/asset_publisher/ueRnd4KL4Z0I/content/classificazione-
attivita-economica-ateco-2007 
 http://ateco.infocamere.it/ateq/ricercaGruppi.action 
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Chart 4.2: Industry sector 
more likely to occur among companies that have businesses in the finance and in the 
manufacturer sectors (respectively, 36% and 29% among all the companies that delist 
during the period). Moreover, a sizable percentage of delisted companies belongs to the trade 
market (7%) and telecommunications industry (6%). The industries that report less than 2 
companies (primary sector, services, and leisure activities) have been grouped in the category 
“other”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As far as we know, the reasons that explain the prevalence of delisting in the financial sector 
have not been covered by any existing neither theoretical nor empirical study. We believe that 
part of the phenomenon is due to M&A activities that characterized the financial sector. 
Indeed, 49% of going private deals in this sector is performed through merger and/or 
acquisition, a rather higher percentage than what reported for the overall sample in Chart 4.1. 
Without the pretention of giving a complete dissertation about the topic of M&A among 
banks, it is relevant to know that in the last years several financial and technological changes 
have “altered the optimal production functions of financial firms” (De Young et al., 2009, 
pp.88), making consolidation particularly profitable both in terms of operational efficiency 
and of market power.  
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On the other hand, the predominance of delistings in the manufacturer sector can be due to the 
rules used to categorize the businesses. According to the Adeco classification, indeed, this 
label comprises a wide range of activities. Therefore, it is plausible that applying Adeco to all 
companies listed in Borsa Italiana, we would find an overall prevalence in manufacturer 
sector.  
 
RESULTS:  
Geranio (2004) documents that the going-to-private transactions became particularly 
relevant in Italy since 2000. The table below (Table 4.1) reports the number of IPOs and the 
number of voluntary delistings occurred in Borsa Italiana during the analysed period, and the 
annual delta (calculated as the difference between IPO and delisting).  
 
Table 4.1: Listing and delisting events occurred in Borsa Italiana between January 1995 and 
30
th
 April 2015 
Year IPO DELISTING DELTA 
1995 14 17 -3 
1996 15 17 -2 
1997 14 17 -3 
1998 26 17 9 
1999 38 8 30 
2000 49 18 31 
2001 19 20 -1 
2002 15 13 2 
2003 12 26 -14 
2004 10 5 5 
2005 19 9 10 
2006 46 15 31 
2007 49 13 36 
2008 10 17 -7 
2009 8 10 -2 
2010 10 7 3 
2011 10 8 2 
2012 7 10 -3 
2013 20 7 13 
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2014 28 8 20 
2015* 9 2 7 
TOT 359 264 MEAN: 7,8 
 
 
As we can note (considering also Chart 4.3), during the last two decades the Italian market 
has been characterized by a heterogeneous number of listing and delisting companies. The 
prevailing trend is a delta that oscillates between +2 and -3; however there are periods during 
which the difference is strongly positive or strongly negative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two-year periods 1999-2000 and 2006-2007 can be defined as periods of hot market, 
during which the IPOs exceed the PtP transactions. On the other hand, the year 2003 and the 
period 2008-2009 are defined as cold market period (in our sample the widest differential is 
reached in 2003 when the delisting surpassed the listing by 14 units). The idea that financial 
downturns provoke higher numbers of delisting is not surprising and it has been already 
documented in researchers presented in paragraph 1.2 (see pp.8 for the hot and cold market 
theory). In Italy, the negative peak of 2003 could be due to the delayed effects of the dot-com 
bubble that characterized the American markets in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 
XXI century. This explanation is realistic since many studies point out that in various aspects 
the Continental Europe markets remark the U.S. ones with some delay. Moreover, the 
financial crisis that hurt the country in 2008 boosts the phenomenon of delisting 
companies. The number of delistings around this year is not as negative as we expected, 
however we must remark that the sample excluded involuntary going private transactions, 
Source: Borsa Italiana, our elaboration  
*until April 2015 
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which could be a substantial number in situations like this. Finally, to conclude the analysis of 
the graph, nowadays (2013-2015) delta is returning positive with a new phase of hot market.  
Comparing the Italian situation with Figure 1.5 (pp.10) regarding the UK market, it becomes 
evident that our sample is characterized by more frequent negative balance of annual listed 
and delisted companies: in the English case, the unique period of negative delta is reported 
during the financial crisis that hit the economy in the years 2009-2011, while in Italy there are 
8 cases. One possible explanation is that the companies listed in Borsa Italiana are particularly 
vulnerable to the speculative behaviour of the management. Geranio (2004) states that 
companies that trade in the Italian market often go public or private without a clear long term 
strategy. According to the speculative hypothesis, when the market experiences a bull 
period, the management that decides to go public can sell the stocks at particularly high prices 
(also due to investors’ optimism), gathering high amount of capital. On the other hand, when 
the markets are in a downturn period, such as during the financial crisis of 2008, several 
parties can be interested in repurchasing the shares in order to benefit from the lower prices 
due to factors not correlated with the company’s situations or with sector’s problem. In the 
first chapter we have reported Figure 1.3 (pp.8) that shows how the Italian listing waves move 
symmetrically to the delisting waves; scholars suggest that these trends support the hypothesis 
that there may be some macro events that boost the number of listing or delisting. In order to 
further understand if the delisting phenomenon is influenced by periods of bear and bull (hot 
and cold market theory), we plot the differential between the number of IPO and the number 
of delisted company with the FTSE MIB Index (at the end of the year) for the years 1995-
2014 (Chart 4.4). The FTSE MIB is the benchmark stock market index for Borsa Italiana. 
This index can be considered representative of the Italian national stock exchange 
performance because it includes 40 of the most-traded Italian stocks, which correspond to 
almost 80% of the market capitalization of the Italian market.  
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It is clear that the two variables move roughly symmetrically, indeed the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is equal to 0,735954. In other words, when the market is poorly performing, the 
difference between admission and delisting is low or negative, meaning that there have been 
more delistings than listings. In some cases, the reaction of management to the performance 
of the market seems delayed of one year. This can be due either to the fact that the index is 
measured at the end of the year and to the time required for the implementation of the 
delisting process (some time limits are compulsory by law, as observed in Chapter 3, pp.38 
and 42). Overall, we can conclude that it is reasonable to mention the speculative 
hypothesis and the application of hot and cold market theory as reasons that push 
delisting in the Italian context. 
The literature review suggests that one of the main reasons for the growth of importance of 
the delisting phenomenon could be the low interest rates that facilitate LBO transactions. 
Other researches underline that at the end of the XX century, going public became a reason of 
pride and it was considered “trendy” by many companies. It is likely that ex-post the market 
selected only the more suitable companies and that new-entered firms characterized by poor 
performance suffer in periods of downturn. Similarly, Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006) 
believe that the relative high number of delisted companies of the last decades could partially 
be due to the worsen quality of the recent listed companies that provoke an early delisting. 
The list provided by Borsa Italiana about the delistings does not include the IPO’s date of the 
sample. Therefore, we start from the list of IPOs occurred in the years 1995-2012
12
 and we 
compute the annual percentage of PtP transactions among them (Table 4.2). In order to verify 
the assumption, we expect that companies that go public during the earlier years are less 
likely to delist than the IPOs of the more recent years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 We exclude the years 2013-2014-2015 because the lack of available years after the IPOs may have an 
influence of the analysis.  
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However, as we can observe in the above table, there is not a clear trend along time and the 
companies listed during the XXI century are not more subjected to delisting. Overall, we tend 
to reject the hypothesis that Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006) proved to be true in the 
American market, for the Italian one. Moreover, looking at Table 4.3 (below) another 
observation that can be gathered by this analysis is that the great majority of Italian 
corporations delist within 10 years from the IPO’s year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPO year Delisted until 2015 (%) 
1995 21,4 
1996 60 
1997 50 
1998 73,1 
1999 42,1 
2000 24,5 
2001 31,6 
2002 40 
2003 25 
2004 30 
2005 31,6 
2006 15,2 
2007 10,2 
2008 10 
2009 0 
2010 0 
2011 20 
2012 14,3 
IPO year Delisted until 2015 (%) Within 5 years Within 10 years 
1995 21,4 33,33% 66,67% 
1996 60 55,56% 100% 
1997 50 71,43% 85,71% 
1998 73,1 72,73% 100% 
1999 42,1 43,75% 81,25% 
2000 24,5 58,33% 100% 
2001 31,6 50% 83,33% 
2002 40 50% 100% 
2003 25 100% 100% 
2004 30 n.s n.s. 
2005 31,6 n.s n.s 
2006 15,2 n.s n.s 
2007 10,2 n.s n.s 
2008 10 n.s n.s 
2009 0 n.s n.s 
2010 0 n.s n.s 
2011 20 n.s n.s 
2012 14,3 n.s n.s 
Table 4.2: Annual percentage of 
delistings among companies that enter 
in Borsa Italiana in different years. 
Table 4.3.Years of permanence in the Stock Exchange before 
delisting.  
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Undoubtedly the result must be enriched with future data, however, among companies that go 
public in 1996 all the delisted companies do that before 10 years; the same for IPOs occurred 
in the years 1998 and 2000. In other words, it seems that the earlier years of the public 
experience are those that give the more arduous threats.  
 
When we have described the main delisting techniques, we confirm that Italian companies 
mainly go private through tender offer. However, Chart 4.1 aggregates all the delisting 
during the sample period 1995-2015. But, if we look at the trend among years, it is interesting 
to note that it has not always been the same. First of all, it is observable that the predominance 
of tender offer over M&A is a phenomenon of the last years; indeed, until 2005, several years 
have a substantial higher percentage of M&A than takeover bids (for instance, in 2002, 
mergers amount to 60% of the total annual deals). A second consideration is that, as we 
expected, the impact of PtP transactions due to bankruptcy is higher in periods of downturn 
(for example, years 2004 and 2011). Finally, also the last period analysed shows an annual 
steady increase of companies delisted because of failure or bankruptcy. As suggested in the 
sample description’s part, given that these companies have not been included in our sample 
they can partially explain the particular positive and high delta of the last years. In other 
words, it could be that nowadays the involuntary delisting phenomenon is gaining ground 
over the voluntary deals.  
  
4.2 REASONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF DELISTING 
 
Following the structure of Chapter II of the literature review, the aim of this section is 
twofold: on one hand we want to investigate which are the reasons that have the greater 
impact in the delisting decision. In order to do that, we will analyse some variables that the 
literature has suggested as proxies to measure the costs and benefits of listing for a subsample 
of delisted organizations and other comparable firms that remain listed. We want to 
understand which is (are) the problem that the companies that operate in Borsa Italiana try to 
overcome through the delisting process. Then, we will look at the consequences of delisting. 
Given the predominance of voluntary delisting, we hypothesize that management that decides 
to go private expects to gain some benefits in terms of overall performance. In this part the 
comparable companies will be used to reduce the eventuality that changes in financial 
measures are due to the overall industry performance, rather than by the delisting event. In 
other words, in our analysis we used the non-delisted companies as benchmarks.  
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To answer these questions, we will first of all adopt descriptive statistics analysing and 
comparing the data collected. Then we will use some more sophisticated statistical analyses 
to investigate particular aspects.  
 
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
The first compulsory reduction of the previous sample is due to the availability of financial 
data. As already mentioned, data used in this section come from Aida. The database provides 
Italian companies’ financial information only for a restricted period: the first year available is 
2005, and the last year available is 2013. Since to conduct the analysis we need the 
accounting number of one year before and one year after the delisting, it is possible to analyse 
only the companies delisted from 2006 until 2012. This screen leaves us with 80 
companies.  
Moreover, in order to pursue our goal, it is necessary that all the elements of the sample can 
be evaluated as standalone items after delisting. For this reason, and following what suggested 
in the paper of Croci and Del Giudice (2014), the reduced sample excludes also the 
delisting due to mergers and acquisition (30 firms). We also control that there are no cases 
in which the firms that delist from Borsa Italiana migrate in other regulated markets because 
otherwise we would have to exclude them since their performances would be still influenced 
by the possibility to trade their shares in a stock exchange. After these adjustments, the new 
sample consists of 50 companies.  
Finally, as suggested by several previous researches on the phenomenon (Croci et Del 
Giudice, 2014; Tutino et al., 2013), we remove the remaining organizations that operate 
in the financial industry because they could introduce biases in the measures that we have 
selected to evaluate the reasons and consequences of delisting. For instance, these firms are 
usually more leveraged than those operating in other industries and their Return on assets 
(ROA) is barely comparable with those of other sectors. This reduces the available firms to 
36 industrial companies. 
Unlikely, for 8 of these corporations we do not find enough data in Aida and thus we have 
been forced to eliminate them from the sample. The final subsample is of 28 organizations. 
The number of observations is not large, however “this is an inherent problem in the going 
private research” (Michelsen et Klein, 2011, pp.57).  
 
For each variable of the subsample we need to establish the average performance of 
industry in which it operates. Since our aim is to minimize any sector bias in the results, we 
select all the current listed companies that operate in similar sectors. Borsa Italiana classifies 
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stocks into 10 industries: 1) oil and gas; 2) basic materials; 3) industrials; 4) consumer goods; 
5) health care; 6) consumer services; 7) telecommunications; 8) utilities; 9) financials; 10) 
technology. Some of these categories are then further detailed in subcategories
13
. This 
classification is more commodity-related compared to the classification used in the previous 
section; however the detailed Adeco 2007 classification provided by Aida allows us to link 
each delisted company to one of these groups. In addition, we judge every listed company and 
whenever its activity is too different from the pertinent delisted company we remove it from 
the control group. We also check whether the companies listed nowadays were already listed 
in the period when the matched company has been delisted. After having allocated each firm 
to an industry, we calculate the mean and the median of the selected measures for all listed 
companies in that particular sector. The sector median has also been used when Aida misses 
few data for a particular organization or where the numbers were not significant.  
 
VARIABLES AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
In order to understand which firms’ characteristics lead to delisting, and to investigate 
whether the companies can glean benefits, we define key variables based on financial 
statement information. Considering the database available, we report these measures on firm 
profitability one year before (T-1) and one year after (T+1) the occurrence of delisting. 
One of the more intuitive reasons for going public is the access to new sources of finance and 
the possibility to have greater bargaining power with banks. We hypothesize that the firms 
that have a median leverage higher than that of their sector are more likely to delist because it 
means that they have not been able to take advantage of the listing status to rebalance their 
debt position. Other scholars (for example Tutino et al., 2014) suggest that a lower level of 
debt can incentivize LBO transactions. Looking at the consequences of delisting, we expect a 
higher leverage after delisting for two reasons: first, because companies could decide to 
finance the transaction through debt (see leveraged buyout in Chapter III); secondly because 
companies could need to replace part of the capital that was raised among public investors. 
The leverage has been computed as: 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠⁄ . 
Linked to the issue about the possible increase in debt to sustain the transaction, many 
scholars argue that one important source of performance improvement is the decrease in taxes 
paid (tax benefits hypothesis). The taxes paid reported in the financial statements have been 
standardized dividing them for the total assets.  
                                                             
13 For more information visit: 
http://www.borsaitaliana.it/azioni/cercatitolo/ricercaavanzata/indexricercaavanzata.htm 
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Related to the idea that the necessity of new sources of finance can encourage companies to 
go public, it is reasonable to suppose that for a company that is experiencing high growth 
rate is more convenience to be listed. Mature firms may have more incentive to delist because 
the low growth can be probably financed through capital internally generated. To prove this 
hypothesis we use the revenue growth rate and the ROE 
((𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄ ) ∗ 100) as indicators of stable businesses (Tutino et 
al., 2014).  
Many scholars and previous researches on different countries have suggested that small 
companies are more likely to delist. The first reason is that for small firms is more difficult to 
amortise the high direct and indirect costs linked to the listing status. Moreover, the 
dimension of the firms can be used as a good predictor of the coverage of financial analysts 
(Pour et Lasfer, 2013), which is an element that reduces the risk of asymmetric information 
(the smaller the company, the lower the likelihood to be followed). In our analysis we use 
total assets and the number of employees as proxies for the dimension of the company. 
Even if previous surveys are contradictory on the topic, Croci and Del Giudice (2014) suggest 
that companies are forced to downsize after delisting in order to keep efficiency. On the other 
hand the number of employees usually turns out to be stable or even slightly higher after the 
deal.  
Finally, to judge the impact of PtP transactions on operating performance we use the ΔROA 
and the ΔEBIT margin (computed as EBITDA on sales)14. The operating performance will 
be content of particular attention since it is the more debatable in the literature review and 
there is no consensus about the impact of the delisting.  
Diagram 4.1a summarizes the expected impact of the different variables on the probability of 
delisting. Diagram 4.1b recaps the forecasted behaviour of the measures after the deal.   
Diagram 4.1a 
PRE-TRANSACTION 
   
VARIABLES If… PROBABILITY 
DELISTING 
 Leverage High  
Stable business 
Revenue Growth High  
ROE  High  
Dimension 
Tot. assets High  
Number employees High  
                                                             
14 The variations have been defined as the difference between the index in the first year after 
delisting and the one in the year before delisting.  
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Diagram 4.1b 
POST-TRANSACTION 
  
VARIABLES CONSEQUENCE OF 
DELISTING 
 Leverage  
Tax paid  
Tot. assets  
Number employees  
Operating 
performance 
ΔEBIT 
 
ΔROA  
 
 
Table 4.4 describes the selected subsample of 28 firms delisted between 2006 and 2012 in 
terms of annual mean and median for the selected set of variables. For a better understanding 
of the phenomenon it is more appropriate to take into consideration the median rather than the 
mean because the delisted firms are very different from each other and therefore the mean 
may be influenced by outlier values. The last two columns report the results of the Wilcoxon 
Signed-Ranks Sum Test. The nonparametric test has been preferred to the t-test because it is 
not possible to presume a normal distribution of the data, and because of the small dimension 
of the sample.  
 
Table 4.4. Annual mean and median of the variables for the delisted companies one year 
before and one year after the delisting. 
  T-1 T+1  
  Mean  Median Mean Median V p-value 
EBITDA margin (%) -23,30 7,72 - 15,34                 4,94  224 0,6406 
Leverage 0,50 0,49 0,52 0,55 188 0,7451 
Tax paid 0,039 0,009 0,004 0,001 213 0,3538 
Revenue growth (%) 4,55% 0,85% 65,56% -3,90% 238 0,4321 
Employment 1110 540 1223 594 199 0,9365 
ROA (%) 1,20 1,18 -0,81 -0,69 237 0,4456 
ROE (%) -0,90 4,99 -2,43 0,92 274 0,1085 
Tot assets 360.074.660 342.898.377 437.620.340 415.637.000 149 0,2231 
 
Contrary to what we have supposed (an improvement in operating performance), the 
EBITDA margin decreases after the PtP transaction. At a first glance this result could 
suggest that the operating performance gets worse because of the new private status. 
However, the difference between the data is not significant at a confidence level of 95%, and 
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thus we tend to conclude that the delisting event has any impact on this index. The nature of 
this change will be studied more in detail thereafter.  
The level of indebtedness does not demonstrate significant changes, supporting the theory 
that the Italian companies rarely finance the transactions through additional debt, as happen in 
the case of leveraged buyout. It is more likely that the debt growth is due to the necessity to 
replace the capital that was raised through the public investors of the Exchange. The Italian 
sample reports a decrease in taxes (in particular if we look at the mean), even if probably this 
cannot be attributed to the increase in interests’ payment as the literature review suggests. The 
low impact that the delisting event has on these variables is supported by the p-values that 
suggest accepting the hypothesis about the equivalence of the two samples. The result is not 
surprising and quite in line with the literature review that underlines the fact that in Europe 
the fiscal policy is not really advantageous for these types of transactions.  
The industrial companies analysed are characterized by a median of revenue growth before 
the delisting in line with the median of the Italian GDP growth in the period 2006-2012 
(mean= -0,5; median=0,4. Source: Istat), suggesting that these organizations have reached the 
maturity stage. On the other hand, the rate becomes negative after the PtP transaction. Given 
this data, we can suppose that the reduction in taxes previously documented has been 
provoked more by a decrease in revenues rather than a benefit linked to a higher debt. Also in 
this case, however, the difference between the two periods is not statistically significant. 
Likewise, the ROE is lower after the deal both in the mean and in the median, but once again 
the p-value is too high to conclude that the decrease is due to the delisting. This result is 
particularly surprising because most researches report a positive impact on this index.  
As we have seen, in many countries delisting is not detrimental in terms of the number of 
employees. Indeed, in the Italian context the median number of employees increases in 
T+1. This improvement can be partially due to the necessity to increase the organic in order 
to face the increase in total assets, used in this analysis as a proxy for the dimension of the 
company. However, the increase in total assets is not due to the going private transaction.  
Finally, the ROA of the subsample decreases after the delisting operation. Also in this case, 
however, we want to investigate through regression analysis if the change is due to the going-
private transaction or to other external factors because the difference does not appear to be 
significant. We must remember, indeed, that Table 4.4 does not consider the overall trend of 
the economy.  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4.5.a shows the median of the indexes divided by industries for going private 
companies in the period 2006-2012 and for the control group for the year before the delisting. 
Table 4.5.b does the same for the year after the deal. The selected subsample and the control 
sample are ranked by industry in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. Sample description by industries 
INDUSTRY GOING PRIVATE CONTROL SAMPLE N 
Industrials  5 12 17 
Fashion 5 7 12 
Building and materials 4 5 9 
Telecommunications 3 3 6 
Technology 3 7 10 
Journey  3 2 5 
Health care 2 6 8 
Chemistry 1 2 3 
Public services 1 10 11 
Cars and equipment  1 5 6 
Samples 28 59 87 
 
The first important consideration is that it is not possible to find clear trends in the 
variables across the industries. This observation lets us to suppose that the delisting 
phenomenon is influenced by the different markets in which the companies have business.  
Looking at the characteristics that could boost the decision to delist (Table 4.5.a), the data 
about the industrial and the public services sectors confirm the results of previous researches: 
the delisted companies on average have a higher leverage than the control sample, a lower 
revenue growth and are smaller and less efficient than the comparable firms. These results are 
partially confirmed also in the fashion sector (with the exception of the total assets that are 
higher for the firms that go private), and in the chemistry and cars and equipment
15
 sectors (in 
these cases, however, the leverage is lower for the companies subjected to the deal). 
Completely different is the case of the building and materials industry where the delisted 
companies report median revenue growth significantly higher and they are bigger than the 
comparable ones. Moreover, the two samples are almost equally efficient and indebted. 
                                                             
15 In this comparison, however, some variables are not significant because the going private firm that operates 
in this sector misses several observation in T-1 and we have replaced them with the median of the control 
sample.  
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Similar results (with minor differences) characterize the technology and the health care 
sectors.  
On the other hand, Table 4.5.b illustrates the median of the performance in the years after the 
delisting. In some sectors (industrials, fashion, chemistry and public services) the operating 
performance computed through the EBITDA margin, the revenue growth, and the ROA is 
negatively affected by the delisting transaction in comparison to the median of the sector. In 
other industries the operating performance improves: telecommunications, technology, health 
care, and cars and equipment. Finally, we have two cases (Building and materials, and 
journey) where the EBITDA margin gets worse, but the revenue growth increases. This last 
group of industries is partially in contrast with what reported in Chapter II about the study of 
Renneboog and Simons (2005), who document that the benefits in terms of operating 
performance comes mainly from cost cutting, rather than from more revenues. Analysing the 
leverage, we can conclude that overall the companies once delisted have a level of debt more 
in line with the mean of the sector (excluding the telecommunications and technology cases), 
and in many cases there is actually a tax reduction attested by the negative level of tax paid.  
The last two columns of each table report the t-statistic and the p-value of the two samples 
(going private and control sample) irrespective of the industry. None variables result to be 
statistically significant considering a confidence level of 95%. Only the ROE variable is 
significant after the delisting if we increase the parameter α at 10%. In other words, 
considering the sample of 28 Italian companies that delist during the period 2006-2012, it is 
possible to gather that accounting numbers play a secondary role in the decision to delist. The 
absence of a corporate financial analysis that support the going-private decision may be one 
of the reasons why there is no evidence for causality between the firms’ performances and ad 
the delisting event (last two columns of Table 4.5.b). 
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Finally, we calculate the adj.ΔROA in order to “distinguish between expected and 
unexpected changes in performance” (Croce et Del Giudice, 2014, pp.387). This index is the 
change of ROA previously reported minus the variation in the median ROA of the listed firms 
in the same industry of the delisted company. The median variation of this measure is equal to 
0,3525 and therefore we suppose that it is not the delisting process to reduce the operating 
performance (as gathered by the observation of Table 4.4), once having controlled the trends 
of the different industries. On one hand, we exclude for the Italian sample the hypothesis 
suggested by some scholars that the companies that go private are more efficient because they 
are subject to more rigid control and tailored strategies. On the other hand, we also reject the 
theory according to which the delisted companies suffer because of the reduction of invested 
capital and collective control on their activities.  
 
In order to determine the variables that have an effect on the delisting probability, we decide 
to use the method of logit model by maximum likelihood, similarly to what performed in 
previous researches such as Tutino et al. (2013) and Michelsen and Klein (2011). In this 
model, the dependent variable is equal to zero when we are considering a company that 
remains listed and one if the company goes private. Following the methodology of Michelsen 
and Klein (2011) and Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2008) among all the companies of the 
control sample, we select the listed companies on Dec. 31, 2012 (the last year considered in 
the subsample).  
After having check for possible correlation of the measures (Table 4.7) we have estimated two 
different model specifications that differ in respect to the inclusion of different variables.  
 
Table 4.7. Correlation among variables 
 Leverage Revenue 
growth 
ROE Total assets Employment 
Leverage 1,000000000 -0,01113671 -0,008952145 0,006646014 0,26440970 
Revenue 
growth 
 1,000000000 -0,275162992 0,108024475 0,06144197 
ROE  1,000000000 0,190668436 0,06936603 
Total assets  1,000000000 0,35067909 
Employment  1,000000000 
  
The first model (Table 4.8) includes all the variables that according to studies applied to 
different countries could change the probability of a company to delist. Not one of the 
measures proves to be statistically significant.  
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Table 4.8. Logit model - Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
The leverage variable proves to be the less significant. In other words, a high level of 
indebtedness does not increase the probability that a company delist; thus we can infer that the 
Italian companies do not go private because they want to enhance their debt position. 
Moreover, the very low significance of this parameter can be due to the lack of delisting 
through LBO transactions that, as we have already demonstrated, characterize the Italian 
context.  
Therefore, in the second model (Table 4.9) we exclude this variable.  
Table 4.9. Logit model - Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the table shows, the only element that results significant in this case is the intercept, which 
however has not practical meaning in our model. It is quite surprising the result about the 
revenue grow and the ROE. According to our analysis, organizations that operate in a mature 
and stable business do not have greater incentive to delist than companies that require high 
investments to sustain the growth stage (differently to what reported by Tutino et al., 2013). 
We suppose that this result is partially due to the fact that the public status is reason of pride 
for management of Italian corporations, and so they could decide to remain in the Stock 
Exchange even if they are no more dependent on the external capitals.  
Finally, not even the dimensions of the firms turn out to be predictors of the likelihood of 
incurring in a delisting.  
To conclude, these results support the intuition presented in the previous paragraph according 
to which the Italian companies that voluntarily delist do that without a long term strategies but 
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instead they follow the trend of the markets. Appendix A reports other models that we have 
tested, changing the variables included: overall, our results do not change. The absence of 
deeper rational behind the decision to go private remark the difference of the Italian market 
compared to the cases analysed until now in other researches.  
In order to address the topic of the change in the operating performance, we perform a 
regression analysis to ascertain the causal relationship between the variations in ROA 
occurred between the year before and the year after the PtP transactions
16
 and some variables 
that could have determined the change. In order to test the hypothesis that the delisting event 
has a negative impact on operating performance, we formulate the following linear regression:  
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 =  ∆𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + ∆𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 +  ∆𝑡𝑎𝑥 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 +  𝜀 
The selection of these variables has been driven by the hypotheses that according to the 
literature can better fit the Italian context. The variable industry has been introduced as a 
control variable. Table 4.10 shows that the dummy variable of delisting that takes value 1 if 
the company has been delisted and 0 otherwise, is not statistically significant. In other words, 
it seems that the event of the delisting does not provide any significant contribution in the 
variation of the return on assets.  
Table 4.10. Linear regression with ΔROA as dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
16
 This variable has been used by Croci and Del Giudice (2014) as proxies for operating performance. They also 
used the change in ROA in the year before the delisting and three years after the delisting, however our dataset 
does not allow to perform this analysis and we suggest that future studies should take into consideration also 
this measure.  
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It is noteworthy to explain the interpretation of the R² of this model that is equal to 0,3107. R² 
is a measure of the percentage of the variation of the dependent variable explained by the set 
of independent variables. The value of the goodness of fit of our model results quite low. 
However, in our case this measure is not particularly important because we have not the intent 
to use the model for forecasting purposes, but we are simply looking at the delisting 
parameter estimates. In other words, we are not interested in defining all variables that have 
an impact on the variation of operating performance, but to look at the importance of going-
private transactions.  
Appendix A illustrates other models in which we gradually delate some of the variables that 
are non-statistically significant in the above model.  
Our results extend the theory of Croci and Del Giudice (2014) according to whom the ROA of 
delisted Italian companies is not influenced neither by the identity of the investors that carry 
out the transactions nor by the size of the firm. We add an extremely important piece to the 
analysis of operating performance of Italian firms: the delisting event by itself does not have 
any significant impact on the operating results.  
Finally, we decide to change the indicator of operating performance, using the change in 
EBITDA margin. In this case, obviously, the tax paid variable has been excluded because of 
the construction of this dependent variable. The linear regression of this model is: 
 
∆𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  ∆𝑟𝑒𝑣. 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 + ∆𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 +  𝜀 
 
Table 4.11. Linear regression with ΔEBITDA margin as dependent variable 
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However, also in this case the event of delisting does not appear to be the cause of the 
negative variation in the EBITDA margin of the Italian sample.  
The displayed analysis allows us to conclude that the operating performance does not appear 
to be influenced by the phenomenon. This result is particularly relevant considering that 
previous researches do not cover this particular aspect of the Italian phenomenon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The merit of this dissertation is twofold. First, we gather together and reorganize the more 
recent theoretical and empirical researches on delisting. Second, we contribute to describe 
from a qualitative and quantitative point of view the Italian phenomenon, which has been 
poorly analysed in previous papers. The importance of filling the doctrinal gap on this topic 
has been increased by the observation that the delisting process is extremely heterogeneous 
because it depends on a variety of elements such as macroeconomic conditions, markets’ 
regulations, and firm’s governance. Therefore, the European market is completely different 
from the Anglo-Saxon ones, and it is not possible to employ the studies and models based on 
the US market neither to interpret the Italian cases nor to support management in taking 
decisions.   
The phenomenon arose in the early 1980s in the US, and since its emergence the worldwide 
markets have been experienced several delisting waves. In the literature review we have tried 
to give a systematic description of the macro-elements that boost the waves:  
 easy access to credit;  
 low interest rates; 
 favourable regulations; 
 private equity firms’ activity. 
Moreover, during the late 1990s also the number of cross-delisting increases because of: 
 the introduction of stricter regulations,  
 increase in listing costs,  
 liquidity problems,  
 cultural bias.  
More difficult is to find contributions about the reasons why the recent financial crisis 
produces the last waves. A hypothesis mentioned in some papers but barely verified by 
empirical analyses, is that during recession companies are undervalued, either because the 
declining markets or because of the inefficiency of the market in evaluating firm-specific 
information, and thus it could be easier and cheaper to cash out minorities.  
After having described the elements that boost or depress the delisting phenomenon from a 
macro-economic point of view, we looked at the reasons of delisting from the firm’s 
perspective. The decision to delist is the result of the evaluation of the balance of the costs 
and benefits of being listed: whenever the costs exceed the benefits, the company can take 
advantage by the going-private transaction. In order to understand delisting, the hypotheses 
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“traditional incentive related” can be applied to all companies. On the other hand, according 
to our study, the magnitude of the hypotheses related to “agency costs” and “financial 
structure” depend on two elements: i) the firm’s ownership structure, and ii) country’s 
regulations. According to the existing empirical researches, the European companies can gain 
less benefits than Anglo-Saxon ones because their ownership structure is more concentrated 
(therefore they are less subjected to agency theory’s costs) and the fiscal policies for these 
types of transactions are less favourable. We believe that this element has not been 
sufficiently investigated in order to judge the differences in the evolution of the phenomenon 
in the two geographical areas.  
The following step has been the evaluation of the consequences of delisting. Generally 
speaking, the voluntary delisting has a positive effect on companies and on shareholders, 
while involuntary delisting destroys value. There are three non-mutually exclusive sources of 
profit: i) tax benefits; ii) asymmetric information and agency problems; iii) operating 
performance. Many empirical analyses demonstrate that the reduction of the costs 
associated with agency theory is one of the most important benefits also for highly 
concentrated companies. For instance, due to their organizational structure, of Western 
European firms is so concentrated that the divergence between owners and management is not 
an issue, but the delisting can be worthy to eliminate the conflicts between the controlling and 
the minority shareholders. The impact on operating performance is instead still debated and 
there is not agreement on the accounting levers that are involved.  
To conclude the description of the delisting phenomenon from an international point of view, 
we have illustrated the different mechanisms that can be used to go private and the 
jurisdictions that regulate them. We conclude that the European companies prefer to delist 
through tender offer for two main reasons: on one hand, it is the only way that permits to have 
the possibility to cash-out minorities; on the other hand, it can be cheaper for controlling 
shareholders. Instead, Anglo-Saxon companies go private mainly through leveraged buyout. It 
is important to remember that in the American markets companies that delist and deregister 
have still the opportunity to continue to trade in non-regulated markets, such as the Pink 
Sheet. We believe that this is an element that should be taken in greater consideration when 
evaluating the phenomenon because it means in the case of “going dark transactions” they 
have the possibility to keep some advantages deriving from the public status, without being 
subject to the costs related to the compliance to regulations. Finally, another important 
distinction between the two types of jurisdictions is on the minority shareholders’ protection: 
the U.S. and U.K. systems are more flexible, with less minority protection, and thus with a 
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greater number of ex post lawsuits. We suppose that the European stricter laws make the 
delisting process more expensive for the controlling shareholders.  
To summarize, nowadays the delisting process is becoming an increasingly important 
phenomenon of the international markets. However, there are deep differences between the 
Continental European and the Anglo-Saxon markets. The main contribution of our literature 
review is to underline that these differences are not only due to the fact that the European 
markets are less mature, but also because: a) they have less sources of benefits when 
considering delisting; b) they do not have over-the-counter markets where they can trade once 
delisted; c) the process can be more expensive and tedious due to the laws to safeguard 
minority shareholders.   
As illustrated, many aspects of this emerging phenomenon are still debated and/or obscure, in 
particular in some markets. In the first part of the empirical analysis about the Italian 
companies we have described a market characterized by a heterogeneous number of delisting 
and IPOs: overall, the new issues exceed the going-private transactions (the mean of the 
annual difference between listing and delisting is 7,8), however there are also several negative 
peaks. Italian companies usually delist within the first 10 years after delisting, suggesting a 
difficulty in adapting to the new status. We confirm that the voluntary delisting is more 
frequent than the involuntary one, and that Italian corporations go private mainly through the 
mechanism of OPA residuale. The predominance of this type of tender offer strengthens the 
expectation that the process is usually initiated by the controlling shareholders. We 
suppose that this trend is strongly correlated with the peculiarities of Italian companies: first, 
the high ownership concentration makes difficult to external players to acquire the stake 
necessary to dictate the delisting; second, since the companies are often family businesses, the 
owners could be reluctant to share the control and the results with other investors. We also 
notice that a significant percentage of delisted firms operate in the financial sector. Looking at 
the features of these deals it may be that this tendency is partially due to the M&A activity 
that characterizes this industry; however, to our knowledge this aspect has not been analysed 
in previous papers, therefore it is difficult to test our intuition.  
According to us, one of the most important conclusions gathered by our analysis is that the 
Italian companies that delist often do not have a long term strategy that supports this 
solution, but instead the decision is driven by the overall trend of the markets. The intuition 
that the hot and cold market theory and the speculative hypothesis are the primary reasons 
that push companies to go private comes from two observations. First of all, the difference 
between the number of IPOs and delistings moves symmetrically with the FTSE MIB Index, 
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suggesting that firms are more likely to go private when the Stock Exchange is 
underestimating the companies and it is cheaper for the controlling shareholder to acquire the 
stocks from the minorities
17
. Secondly, the logit model applied to a sample of delisted and 
still listed firms does not identify any pre-transaction financial measure that has a significant 
influence in the delisting decision. In other words, accounting numbers play a secondary role 
in the decision to delist.  
 
Finally, we try to understand which benefits a delisted company can gain. From an accounting 
point of view, we have demonstrated that the different industries have different deal’s 
outcome; however, roughly speaking, we can conclude that going-private companies pay less 
taxes, but this is probably due to the lower revenues rather than interest deduction. Also the 
operating performance of the Italian sample decreases after the transaction, however the 
regression analyses performed do not support the causal nexus between these negative 
impacts and the delisting process. Since the operating performance does not appear to be 
influenced by the phenomenon, we believe that the main advantages for Italian companies are 
to the possibility to keep the control of the business without the interference of third parties, 
and the desire to resolve the conflicts between large and minority shareholders, as suggested 
by Bettinelli et al. (2011). This decision is possible because the delisted companies analysed 
in the sample have reached a mature stage, and thus they do not require any more external 
capital (remembering, however, that the life cycle stage theory does not find confirmation in 
our logit model).  
 
From a managerial point of view, our analysis suggests that Italian companies could take 
many other advantages, in addition to those correlated to the ownership control, if they learn 
to analyse their peculiar situation in order to tailor the timing and the best mechanism for the 
delisting. On one hand, the trends of the market and speculation are not sufficient reasons to 
undertake the delisting process. On the other hand, the pride for the public status is not always 
enough to justify the decision to remain listed in the Stock Exchange, and our analysis 
demonstrates that the voluntary delisting should not be seen as a traumatic event. We 
recommend a professional analysis of the costs and benefits of being listed in order to 
continuously assess whether the current status of the company is the best one.  
Our analysis leaves open some questions that deserve to be examined in future research in 
particular on the plausibility of the free cash flow and dividend hypotheses. Moreover, 
                                                             
17 This hypothesis is supported also by the fact that the main technique to go private in Italy is through the 
tender offer.  
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because of data limitation, we do not investigate the impact that the announcement of 
delisting has on the stock price that, as we have reported in the literature review, could bring 
benefits for some categories of stakeholders.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
PAPERS AND BOOKS 
 AKERLOF, G., 1970. The market for Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty, and the Market 
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500. 
 ANGEL, J., et al., 2004. From pink slips to pink sheet: market quality around delisting 
from NASDAQ, Working paper 
 ASQUITH, P., WIZMAN, T., 1990. Event risk, covenants, bondholder returns in 
leverage buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 195-213. 
 BARAN, L.C., KING, T-H.D., 2010. Going private transactions, bondholder returns, 
and wealth transfer effects. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, 1856-1872. 
 BATES, T.W., LEMMON, M.L., LINCK, J.S., 2006. Shareholders wealth effects and 
bid negotiation in freeze-out deals: are minority shareholders left out in the cold? 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.81, 681-708. 
 BECKER, B., POLLET, J., 2008. The decision to go private. Unpublished working 
paper, available at www.essec –private-equity.com/ [accessed on 12nd June 2015] 
 BERK, J., 2011. Finanza aziendale. Pearson: Prentice Hall 
 BESSLER, W., et al., 2012. The listing and delisting of German firms on NYSE and 
NASDAQ: were there any benefits? Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions, and Money, 22, 1024-1053. 
 BETTINELLI, C., DANOVI, A., FABRIZI, E., 2011. Going private in Italy. 
Characteristics and motivations of PtP transactions. 4
th
 Annual EuroMed Conference 
of the EuroMed Academy of Business. Elounda, Crete, Greece, Oct20th-21st. 
 BHARATH, S.T., DITTMAR, A.K., 2010. Why do firms use private equity to opt out 
of public market? The Review of Financial Studies, 23, 1772-1818. 
 BOOT, A.W.A., GOPALAN, R., THAKOR, A.V., 2006. The Entrepreneur’s choice 
between private and public ownership. The Journal of Finance, LXI (2), 803-837. 
 BOUBAKER, S., CELLIER, A., ROUATBI, W., 2014. The sources of shareholder 
wealth gains from going private transactions: the role of controlling shareholders. 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 43, 226-246. 
 CHANDY P.R., SARKAR, S.K., TRIPATHY, N., 2004. Empirical evidence on the 
effects of delisting from the national market system. Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 28 (1), 46-55. 
 CHAPLINSKY, S., RAMCHAND, L., 2007. From Listing to Delisting: Foreign 
Firms’ Entry and Exit from the US. Working Paper, Darden School – University of 
Virginia. 
 CHEN, K.C.W., SCHODERBEK, M.P., 1999. The role of accounting information in 
security exchange delisting. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 31 (1), 31-57. 
 COFFEE, J., 1999. The future as history: the prospects for global convergence in 
corporate governance and its implications. Northwestern University Law Review, 93, 
641-708. 
 COLOMBO, G.E., 2002. Delisting e azioni di risparmio (due pareri contrapposti). 
Banca borsa titoli di credito, fasc.3, pag.364. 
 CROCI, E., DEL GIUDICE, A., 2014. Delisting, Controlling shareholders and Firm 
performance in Europe. European Financial Management, 20 (2), 374-405. 
83 
 
 CUMMING, D., SIEGEL, D., WRIGHT, M., 2007. Private Equity, leveraged buyouts 
and governance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(4), 439-60. 
 DAUGHERTY, M., GEORGIEVA, D., 2011. Foreign cultures, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and cross-delisting. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 21, 208-223. 
 DE  YOUNG, R., EVANOFF, D.D., MOLYNEUX, P., 2009. Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Financial Institutions: A review of the Post-2000 Literature. Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 36 (2-3), 87-110. 
 DE ANGELO, H., DE ANGELO, L., RICE, E.M., 1984. Going Private: Minority 
Freeze-out and Stockholder Wealth.  Journal of Law & Economics, XXVII, 367-401.  
 DJAMA, C., MARTINEZ, I., SERVE, S., 2012. What do we know about delistings? 
A survey of the literature. Working Paper n.38, Universitè de Cergy  Pontoise, France. 
 FRANKS, J.R., NYBORG, K.G., 1996. Control Rights, Debt Structure, and the Loss 
of Private Benefits: the Case of the UK Insolvency Code. The review of Financial 
Studies, 9 (4), 1165-1210. 
 GERANIO, M., 2004. Il delisting dal mercato azionario italiano: analisi empirica delle 
cause e delle conseguenze. Paper n. 7, Università Bocconi, Milano. 
 GOU, S., HOTCHKISS, E.S., SONG, W., 2011. Do Buyouts (still) create value? The 
Journal of Finance, LXVI (2), 479-517. 
 GUPTA, K., KRISKNAMURTI, C., TOURANI-RAD, A., 2013. Is corporate 
governance relevant during financial crisis? Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions & Money, 23, 85-110. 
 HARRIS, J.K., PANCHAPAGESAN, V., WERNER, I.M., 2008. Off but not gone: a 
study of Nasdaq delistings. Fisher College of Business Working paper, 005. 
 HELWEGE, J., LIANG, N., 2004. Initial Public Offerings in Hot and Cold markets, 
Journal o Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39 (3), 541-569. 
 JENSEN, M.C., 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), 305-360. 
 JENSEN, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76 (2), 323-329. 
 JONES, C.S., 1992. The attitudes of owner-managers towards accounting control 
systems following management buyout. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17, 
151-168. 
 KAPLAN, S., 1989. Management Buyouts: Evidence on Tax as a Source of Value. 
The Journal of Finance, 44 (3), 611-632. 
 KAPLAN, S., STROMBERG, P., 2009. Leverage Buyouts and Private Equity. 
Journal of Economic Perspective, 23(1), 121-146. 
 LAMBA, A.S., KHAN, W.A., 1999. Exchange listings and delistings: the role of 
insider information and insider trading. The Journal of Financial Research, XXII (2), 
131-146. 
 LICHT, A., 2003. Cross-listing and corporate governance: bonding or avoiding? 
Chicago Journal of International Law, 4 (1), 141-163. 
 LOUGHRAN, T., RITTER, J., 1994. The operating performance of firms conducting 
seasoned Equity offerings. University of Iowa and University of Illinois, unpublished 
paper. 
 LUCIANO, A., LACCHINI, M., 2011. Lo squeeze out statutario: una prospettiva di 
fattibilità. Gurisprudenza Commerciale, 6, 904. 
 MACEY, J. R., O'HARA, M., POMPILIO, D., 2008. Down and Out in the Stock 
Market: The Law and Economics of the Delisting Process. Faculty Scholarship Series. 
Paper 3873. 
 MAROSI, A., MASSOUD, N., 2007. Why do firms go dark? Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 42, 421-442. 
84 
 
 MARTINEZ, I., SERVE, S., 2011. The delisting decision: The case of buyout offer 
with squeeze-out (BOSO). International Review of Law and Economics, 31, 228-239. 
 MEERA, A.K., TRIPATHY, N., REDFEARN, M.R., 2000. Wealth and Liquidity 
effects of stock delistings: empirical evidence from the stock exchanges of Singapore 
and Malaysia. Applied Financial Economics, 10, 199-206. 
 MICHELSEN, M., KLEIN, C., 2011. “Privacy, please!” The public to private decision 
in Germany. Review of Managerial Science, 5, 49-85. 
 MITCHELL, M., MULHERIN, H., 1996. The impact of industry shocks on takeover 
and restructuring activity. Journal of Financial Economics, 193-229. 
 MUSCARELLA, C.J., VETSUYPENS, M.R., 1990. Efficiency and organizational 
structure: a study of reverse LBOs, Journal of Finance, 45, 1389-1413. 
 ONESTI, T., ROMANO, M., FAVINO, C., PIERI, V., 2013. Going Private and Going 
Dark Strategies: Literature Review and Directions for Future Research. Proceedings of 
World Business and Social Science Research Conference. 
 POMELLI, A., 2009. Delisting di società quotata tra interesse dell’azionista di 
controllo e tutela degli azionisti di minoranza. Rivista delle società, fasc.2-3, 407. 
 POUR, E.K., LASFER, M., 2013. Why do companies delist voluntary from the stock 
market? Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, 4850-4860. 
 RENNEBOOG, L., SIMONS, T., 2005. Public-to-Private Transactions: LBOs, MBOs, 
MBIs, IBOs. ECGI Finance Working Paper N.94/2005. 
 RENNEBOOG, L., SIMONS, T., WRIGHT, M., 2007. Why do public firms go 
private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and 
undervaluation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13 (4), 591-628. 
 SANGER, G.C., PETERSON, J.D., 1990. An Empirical Analysis of Common Stock 
Delisting. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25 (2), 261-272. 
 SERVE, S., MARTINEZ, I., DJAMA, C., 2012. Delisting and Corporate Governance: 
a review and research agenda. Europlace Institute of Finance.  
 SFAMENI, P., 2002. La disciplina europea delle offerte pubbliche di acquisto. Rivista 
delle società, 1, 285. 
 SHLEIFER, A., VISHNY, R.W., 1989. Management Entrenchment: the Case of 
Manager-Specific Investments. Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 123-139. 
 SUDARSANAM, S., 2003. Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisition. 2nd ed. 
London: Prentice Hall, Financial Times Press. 
 TUTINO, M., PANETTA, I.C., LAGHI, E., 2013. Key Factors in Delisting Process in 
Italy: Empirical Evidence. GSTF Journal of Business Review (GBR), 2 (4), 218-223. 
 VENTORUZZO, M., 2010. Freeze-outs: Transcontinental Analysis and Reforms 
Proposals. Legal Studies Research Paper N. 5. 
 WITMER, J., 2005. Why do firms cross-(de)list? An examination of the determinants 
and effects of cross-delisting. Bank of Canada 
 YOU, L., 2008. Listing and Delisting over time and around the Globe. Working paper. 
 YOU, L., PARHIZARI, A.M., SRIVASTAVA, S., 2012. Cross-listing and subsequent 
delisting in foreign markets. Journal of Empirical Finance, 19, 200-2016. 
 ZAHRA, S.A., 1995. Corporate entrepreneurship and financial performance: the case 
of management buyouts. Journal of Business Venturing, 10, 225-247. 
 LARRY, H., 2003. Trading and Exchanges. Oxford University Press. 
 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012. Considering an IPO? The costs of going 
and being public may surprise you. Pwc’ Deals practice. 
 MONTI, M., 2012. La crisi e quei 50 “addii” a Piazza Affari. Il Sole 24 Ore [online]. 
Available at: http://www.banchedati.ilsole24ore.com [accessed on: 6
th 
August 2015]  
 
85 
 
 
 
 
WEBSITES 
 
 www.borsaitaliana.it 
 http://www.investopedia.com/ 
 https://it.finance.yahoo.com/ 
 http://www.consob.it/ 
 http://www.infocamere.it/movimprese/ 
 http://ateco.infocamere.it/ateq/ricercaGruppi.action 
 
 
 
RELEVANT LEGISLATION 
 
 Art.108, 111, 133 of the Consolidate Law of Finance (T.U.F) 
 Art.2.5.1, 2.5.6 of the Rules of the Markets organized and managed by Borsa Italiana 
Spa 
 Art.2337, 2368, 2437 of the Italian Civil Code. 
 Art.3, 5, 15 of the Directive 78/855/CEE (Takeover Directive) 
 Art.40, Regolamento Emittenti CONSOB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
In this Appendix different models of the logit model are reported. The key difference among 
them is the inclusion or exclusion of different variables.   
This model excludes the variable employment because some scholars (Michelsen et Klein, 
2011) suggest that the validity of the logit model could be undermined by multicollinearity of 
independent variables. They find that the only variables that manifest this problem are 
employment and total assets. Their result could be explained by the fact that these measures 
have been included as proxies of the same information: the size of the company.  However, 
even after having removed the number of workers, the results do not change (the same if we 
keep employment and remove total assets). These result is supported by the fact that in our 
sample the two variables do not appear to be particularly correlated: correlation (tot.assets, 
employment) = 0,3506791 
(in its paper, Michelsen et 
Klein (2011) consider 
problematic a correlation 
coefficient higher than 
0,5).  
We also try to use the 
natural logarithm of 
total assets, as Croci 
and Del Giudice 
(2014) suggest. Once 
again, however, the 
model does not seem useful to forecast the probability that a company will delist.  
We also test different models for the regression analysis. The idea of these new models is the 
same of the logit model: we exclude some variables in order to overcome the possible bias of 
collinearity, which could affect our regressions given the low number of observations. We 
start eliminating the revenue growth variable that, not considering the variable delisting that 
we cannot delate otherwise the study will not have meaning any more, has the lower 
significance. The significance does not change.  
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Different other regressions have been tested following the same mechanism, but the results do 
not change.  
 
